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Proof of Theorem 2, "Quasiconcavity of utility in the buyer's own strategy", p. 12 — spend increasing; utility increasing below budget, decreasing above when H > M/ϵ

Proved
MultPacing.Existence.theorem_2_quasiconcavity

by mikedeng1 · Oct 24, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

p2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1pacingquasiconcavitysmoothed-game

Fix a pacing game, ϵ>0\epsilon>0ϵ>0, HHH, a buyer iii and the multipliers α−i∈[0,1]N∖{i}\alpha_{-i}\in[0,1]^{N\setminus\{i\}}α−i​∈[0,1]N∖{i} of the other buyers. For a∈[0,1]a\in[0,1]a∈[0,1] write σ(a)=aϵ+∑jsij\sigma(a)=a\epsilon+\sum_j s_{ij}σ(a)=aϵ+∑j​sij​ for buyer iii's total spend and u(a)u(a)u(a) for her utility in the (ϵ,H)(\epsilon,H)(ϵ,H)-smoothed pacing game when she plays αi=a\alpha_i=aαi​=a. Then:

  1. σ\sigmaσ is continuous and strictly increasing on [0,1][0,1][0,1];
  2. uuu is strictly increasing on {a∈[0,1]:σ(a)≤Bi}\{a\in[0,1]:\sigma(a)\le B_i\}{a∈[0,1]:σ(a)≤Bi​};
  3. if MMM satisfies ∑jvkj+2ϵ≤M\sum_j v_{kj}+2\epsilon\le M∑j​vkj​+2ϵ≤M for every buyer kkk and H>M/ϵH>M/\epsilonH>M/ϵ, then uuu is strictly decreasing on {a∈[0,1]:σ(a)≥Bi}\{a\in[0,1]:\sigma(a)\ge B_i\}{a∈[0,1]:σ(a)≥Bi​}.

Since σ\sigmaσ is increasing, the two sets are [0,t][0,t][0,t] and [t,1][t,1][t,1] for the point ttt where the spend reaches BiB_iBi​ (or t=1t=1t=1 if it never does), so uuu increases up to ttt and decreases after it:

u is strictly increasing on {σ≤Bi}  and strictly decreasing on {σ≥Bi}.u \text{ is strictly increasing on } \{\sigma\le B_i\}\ \text{ and strictly decreasing on } \{\sigma\ge B_i\}.u is strictly increasing on {σ≤Bi​}  and strictly decreasing on {σ≥Bi​}.

In particular uuu is quasiconcave in the buyer's own strategy, which is the second hypothesis of the existence theorem behind Theorem 2; part 2 is also used in the proof of Theorem 1.

Formalization Note The other buyers' multipliers enter through a profile α\alphaα with all entries in [0,1][0,1][0,1], and buyer iii's entry is replaced by aaa (Function.update α i a).

Differences from the source:

  • generalization: the bullet is argued under Theorem 2's hypotheses (H>M/ϵH>M/\epsilonH>M/ϵ, and Definition 3's H>0H>0H>0) → parts 1 and 2 for every real HHH, part 3 under ∑jvkj+2ϵ≤M\sum_j v_{kj}+2\epsilon\le M∑j​vkj​+2ϵ≤M and H>M/ϵH>M/\epsilonH>M/ϵ; reason: below the budget the utility does not involve HHH, and the spend never does, so the bound on HHH is needed only for part 3; with the hypotheses in place the statement is the source's.
  • reading: "uiu_iui​ is increasing", "total spend … is increasing", "utility is decreasing" → strictly increasing / strictly decreasing; reason: the paper itself recalls the claim as "strictly increasing … (the strictness is due to the artificial good)" in the proof of Theorem 1, and the strict reading is the stronger one.
  • encoding: "there exists a number ttt such that for αi<t\alpha_i<tαi​<t, uiu_iui​ is nondecreasing … for αi>t\alpha_i>tαi​>t nonincreasing", with ttt the solution of αiϵ+∑jsij=Bi\alpha_i\epsilon+\sum_j s_{ij}=B_iαi​ϵ+∑j​sij​=Bi​ or t=1t=1t=1 → monotonicity on the sets {σ≤Bi}\{\sigma\le B_i\}{σ≤Bi​} and {σ≥Bi}\{\sigma\ge B_i\}{σ≥Bi​}; reason: since σ\sigmaσ is continuous and strictly increasing (part 1) these sets are exactly [0,t][0,t][0,t] and [t,1][t,1][t,1] (the second empty when t=1t=1t=1 is not attained).
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MultPacing_Existence_Smoothed
Formal statement
namespace MultPacing.Existence

theorem theorem_2_quasiconcavity {N G : Type*} [Fintype N] [DecidableEq N] [Fintype G]
    (P : PacingGame N G) (ε H M : ℝ) (hε : 0 < ε) (α : N → ℝ)
    (hα : ∀ k, α k ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1) (i : N) :
    (ContinuousOn (fun a => smSpend P ε (Function.update α i a) i) (Set.Icc 0 1) ∧
      StrictMonoOn (fun a => smSpend P ε (Function.update α i a) i) (Set.Icc 0 1)) ∧
    StrictMonoOn (fun a => smUtility P ε H (Function.update α i a) i)
      {a | a ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1 ∧ smSpend P ε (Function.update α i a) i ≤ P.B i} ∧
    ((∀ k, ∑ j, P.v k j + 2 * ε ≤ M) → M / ε < H →
      StrictAntiOn (fun a => smUtility P ε H (Function.update α i a) i)
        {a | a ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1 ∧ P.B i ≤ smSpend P ε (Function.update α i a) i}) := by sorry

end MultPacing.Existence
Source
Conitzer, Kroer, Sodomka & Stier-Moses, Multiplicative Pacing Equilibria in Auction Markets, arXiv:1706.07151v5, p. 12 (PDF 12), proof of Theorem 2, bullet "Quasiconcavity of utility in the buyer's own strategy"
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 24, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 24, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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