Lemma 4.17 — the randomly biased min work mechanism is strongly truthful
ProvedAlgMechDesign.Randomized.rbmw_strongly_truthfulmechanism-designp2o-batch-p200bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1randomized-mechanismscheduling
For every number of tasks, the randomly biased min work mechanism (the uniform distribution over the biased min work mechanisms with and ) is universally strongly truthful:
- for every , the biased min work mechanism with parameters and is truthful on positive types; and
- for every agent , every positive true type and every positive misreport , there are and a positive declaration of the other agent under which declaring gives agent strictly smaller utility than declaring .
Truthfulness is required for every outcome of the coin tosses, not in expectation.
Formalization Note Given part 1, part 2 says exactly that truth-telling is the only universally dominant strategy (Definition 16); the support of the uniform distribution is all of .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_AlgMechDesign_Randomized_Model import Definitions.Def_AlgMechDesign_Randomized_BiasedMinWork
Formal statement
namespace AlgMechDesign.Randomized
/-- Lemma 4.17: for every number `k` of tasks, the randomly biased min work mechanism
(`β = 4/3`, `s` uniform on `{1, 2}ᵏ`, full support) is universally strongly truthful. -/
theorem rbmw_strongly_truthful {k : ℕ} :
IsUniversallyStronglyTruthful (n := 2) (k := k) (R := Fin k → Fin 2) rbmwAlloc rbmwPay := by sorry
end AlgMechDesign.Randomized
Source
Nisan, Ronen, Algorithmic Mechanism Design, Games Econ. Behav. 35, 2001, p. 182, Lemma 4.17
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.