Theorem 1 — the incentive-feasible set is nonempty, convex, compact, and feasible
ProvedMyersonBargaining.NashSolution.theorem1For every finite Bayesian collective choice problem , let be the interim payoff vectors generated by direct choice mechanisms, and let be those generated by Bayesian incentive-compatible direct choice mechanisms. Then
This establishes the feasible allocation set on which the bargaining problem is defined. Compactness uses the ordinary product topology on the finite-dimensional space of real payoff vectors indexed by player and type.
Formalization Note "Bayesian incentive-compatible" in the definition (10) of is read as "choice mechanism satisfying (2′) and (6)": ranges only over real functions on that are nonnegative and sum to one at every profile. Payoff vectors are real functions on the disjoint union , and compactness and convexity are taken in that finite-dimensional real vector space with the product topology. All four parts of the theorem, including "subset of ", are conclusions.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MyersonBargaining_NashSolution_Bargaining
namespace MyersonBargaining.NashSolution
variable {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] [Nonempty ι]
{A : ι → Type} [∀ i, Fintype (A i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (A i)]
[∀ i, Nonempty (A i)] {C : Type} [Fintype C] [DecidableEq C] [Nonempty C]
/-- Theorem 1, p. 64: the incentive-feasible set is nonempty, convex, compact, and feasible. -/
theorem theorem1 (G : Problem ι A C) :
(FStar G).Nonempty ∧ Convex ℝ (FStar G) ∧ IsCompact (FStar G) ∧
FStar G ⊆ F G := by sorry
end MyersonBargaining.NashSolution
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.