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Theorem 1 — the incentive-feasible set is nonempty, convex, compact, and feasible

Proved
MyersonBargaining.NashSolution.theorem1

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

compactnessconvexitymechanism-designp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

For every finite Bayesian collective choice problem GGG, let FFF be the interim payoff vectors generated by direct choice mechanisms, and let F∗F^*F∗ be those generated by Bayesian incentive-compatible direct choice mechanisms. Then

F∗≠∅,F∗ is convex and compact,F∗⊆F.F^*\ne\varnothing,\qquad F^*\text{ is convex and compact},\qquad F^*\subseteq F.F∗=∅,F∗ is convex and compact,F∗⊆F.

This establishes the feasible allocation set on which the bargaining problem is defined. Compactness uses the ordinary product topology on the finite-dimensional space of real payoff vectors indexed by player and type.

Formalization Note "Bayesian incentive-compatible" in the definition (10) of F∗F^*F∗ is read as "choice mechanism satisfying (2′) and (6)": F∗F^*F∗ ranges only over real functions π\piπ on C×A1×⋯×AnC\times A_1\times\cdots\times A_nC×A1​×⋯×An​ that are nonnegative and sum to one at every profile. Payoff vectors are real functions on the disjoint union ∑iAi\sum_i A_i∑i​Ai​, and compactness and convexity are taken in that finite-dimensional real vector space with the product topology. All four parts of the theorem, including "subset of FFF", are conclusions.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MyersonBargaining_NashSolution_Bargaining
Formal statement
namespace MyersonBargaining.NashSolution

variable {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] [Nonempty ι]
  {A : ι → Type} [∀ i, Fintype (A i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (A i)]
  [∀ i, Nonempty (A i)] {C : Type} [Fintype C] [DecidableEq C] [Nonempty C]

/-- Theorem 1, p. 64: the incentive-feasible set is nonempty, convex, compact, and feasible. -/
theorem theorem1 (G : Problem ι A C) :
    (FStar G).Nonempty ∧ Convex ℝ (FStar G) ∧ IsCompact (FStar G) ∧
      FStar G ⊆ F G := by sorry

end MyersonBargaining.NashSolution
Source
Myerson, Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem, Econometrica 47 (1979), p. 64, Theorem 1
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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