Theorem 14.5: under the buyback contract with the profits are monotone in and any division of is attainable, with the five cases at
ProvedSupplyChainTheory.buyback_allocationTheorem 14.5. Under the buyback contract with the wholesale price of (14.22), evaluated at the chain-optimal quantity , the retailer's profit is decreasing and the supplier's increasing in . Moreover, with
one has , and:
- if , the supplier earns negative profit and the retailer more than ;
- if , the retailer earns the entire supply chain profit;
- if , the profits are shared, both being positive;
- if , the supplier earns the entire supply chain profit;
- if , the retailer earns negative profit and the supplier more than .
Together with Theorem 14.4 this makes buyback a coordinating contract: for some both players earn positive profit at , and any division of between them can be reached by choosing . The proof is the affine identities (14.27)-(14.28) with decreasing in , and the bound for .
Formalization Note requires , which the book's proof attributes to but which is a separate assumption (a chain whose optimal expected profit is not positive has nothing to share); it is a hypothesis here, together with .
Both goodwill costs are also assumed positive, and . The book's standing data allow either to be , and then the printed strict inequalities fail: at , and exactly, and at , exactly. The book's step is strict only when , i.e. . Its own examples have .
import Definitions.Def_SupplyChainTheory_contracts
namespace SupplyChainTheory
theorem buyback_allocation (P : ContractData) (D : MeasureTheory.Measure ℝ) [MeasureTheory.IsProbabilityMeasure D]
(hD : MeasureTheory.Integrable (fun x => x) D) (hmu : 0 < meanDemand D)
(hps : 0 < P.ps) (hpr : 0 < P.pr)
(Q0 : ℝ) (h0 : IsMaxOn (chainProfit P D) Set.univ Q0) (hpos : 0 < chainProfit P D Q0) :
let πr := fun b => retailerProfit P D (buybackTransfer D (buybackPrice P b) b) Q0
let πs := fun b => supplierProfit P D (buybackTransfer D (buybackPrice P b) b) Q0
let b1 := buybackB1 P D Q0
let b2 := buybackB2 P D Q0
StrictAntiOn πr (Set.Icc 0 (P.r - P.v + P.pr))
∧ StrictMonoOn πs (Set.Icc 0 (P.r - P.v + P.pr))
∧ 0 < b1 ∧ b1 < b2 ∧ b2 < P.r - P.v + P.pr
∧ (∀ b, 0 ≤ b → b < b1 → πs b < 0 ∧ chainProfit P D Q0 < πr b)
∧ πr b1 = chainProfit P D Q0
∧ (∀ b, b1 < b → b < b2 → 0 < πr b ∧ 0 < πs b)
∧ πs b2 = chainProfit P D Q0
∧ (∀ b, b2 < b → b ≤ P.r - P.v + P.pr → πr b < 0 ∧ chainProfit P D Q0 < πs b) := by sorry
end SupplyChainTheory
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.