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The legacy sighash ignores scriptSigs and witnesses

Proved
BitcoinSig.sigHashLegacy_skeleton

by pitimespi · Oct 26, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bitcoinbitcoin-mainnetconsensusderecdsaformal-verificationschnorrsecp256k1sighash

For every script code, index and hash type, two transactions with the same version, outputs, lock time, and the same prevouts and sequence numbers in order have the same legacy signature hash. Signatures therefore never sign other signatures.

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinSig
open BitcoinSig BitcoinSer
Formal statement
theorem BitcoinSig.sigHashLegacy_skeleton (scriptCode : Bytes) (tx tx' : Tx) (nIn hashType : Nat)
    (h : BitcoinSig.sameSkeleton tx tx') :
    BitcoinSig.sigHashLegacy scriptCode tx' nIn hashType = BitcoinSig.sigHashLegacy scriptCode tx nIn hashType := by sorry
Source
Bitcoin Core a773e1e33b349dc819b5a0edc1c7a4839dc73b48: IsValidSignatureEncoding, IsLowDERSignature, IsCompressedOrUncompressedPubKey, IsCompressedPubKey, IsDefinedHashtypeSignature, CheckSignatureEncoding, CheckPubKeyEncoding, FindAndDelete, CTransactionSignatureSerializer, SignatureHash (BASE and WITNESS_V0), EvalChecksigPreTapscript, GenericTransactionSignatureChecker::CheckECDSASignature/CheckLockTime/CheckSequence, src/script/interpreter.cpp: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/a773e1e33b349dc819b5a0edc1c7a4839dc73b48/src/script/interpreter.cpp; GetScriptOp, src/script/script.cpp; CPubKey::IsValid/Verify/CheckLowS and ecdsa_signature_parse_der_lax, src/pubkey.cpp and pubkey.h; secp256k1_eckey_pubkey_parse (src/secp256k1/src/eckey_impl.h), secp256k1_ecdsa_sig_verify (ecdsa_impl.h), secp256k1_schnorrsig_verify (modules/schnorrsig/main_impl.h); BIP66, BIP143, BIP340 at bips revision 100ba872c808946155b1eeb8c4568058f2eea0a7
Read-back

What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-fable-5-1 (independent sub-agent, blind: Lean code + auditor instructions only)

Read-back: BitcoinSig.sigHashLegacy_skeleton

Binders and hypothesis. Universally quantified over a byte string scriptCodescriptCodescriptCode, two transactions txtxtx and tx′tx'tx′, and natural numbers nInnInnIn and hashTypehashTypehashType (unbounded). One hypothesis hhh: sameSkeleton tx tx′tx\,tx'txtx′, which unfolds to the conjunction

tx′.version=tx.version ∧ tx′.vout=tx.vout ∧ tx′.nLockTime=tx.nLockTime ∧ [(i.prevout,i.nSequence)]i∈tx′.vin=[(i.prevout,i.nSequence)]i∈tx.vin,tx'.\text{version} = tx.\text{version}\ \land\ tx'.\text{vout} = tx.\text{vout}\ \land\ tx'.\text{nLockTime} = tx.\text{nLockTime}\ \land\ \big[(i.\text{prevout}, i.\text{nSequence})\big]_{i \in tx'.\text{vin}} = \big[(i.\text{prevout}, i.\text{nSequence})\big]_{i \in tx.\text{vin}},tx′.version=tx.version ∧ tx′.vout=tx.vout ∧ tx′.nLockTime=tx.nLockTime ∧ [(i.prevout,i.nSequence)]i∈tx′.vin​=[(i.prevout,i.nSequence)]i∈tx.vin​,

the last conjunct being equality of the two lists obtained by replacing each input by the pair (prevout, sequence number). It therefore forces ∣tx′.vin∣=∣tx.vin∣|tx'.\text{vin}| = |tx.\text{vin}|∣tx′.vin∣=∣tx.vin∣ and position-wise agreement of prevouts and sequences, while allowing every input's scriptSig and witness to differ arbitrarily.

Conclusion.

sigHashLegacy scriptCode tx′ nIn hashType=sigHashLegacy scriptCode tx nIn hashType.\text{sigHashLegacy}\ scriptCode\ tx'\ nIn\ hashType = \text{sigHashLegacy}\ scriptCode\ tx\ nIn\ hashType .sigHashLegacy scriptCode tx′ nIn hashType=sigHashLegacy scriptCode tx nIn hashType.

Unfolding. sigHashLegacy sc t nIn htsc\,t\,nIn\,htsctnInht returns uint256One (byte 1 then 31 zero bytes) when ht&31=3ht \mathbin{\&} 31 = 3ht&31=3 and ∣t.vout∣≤nIn|t.\text{vout}| \leq nIn∣t.vout∣≤nIn — a condition that depends only on the output list, equated by hhh — and otherwise the double SHA-256 of serSigTx t sc nIn htt\,sc\,nIn\,httscnInht followed by the 4-byte little-endian hththt. serSigTx reads: t.versiont.\text{version}t.version (4 bytes); the input count, which is 111 if the ANYONECANPAY bit (128128128) of hththt is set, else ∣t.vin∣|t.\text{vin}|∣t.vin∣; for each serialized input index kkk (overridden to nInnInnIn under ANYONECANPAY): the prevout of input kkk (or of the default input ⟨⟨[ ],0⟩,[ ],0,[ ]⟩\langle\langle[\,],0\rangle,[\,],0,[\,]\rangle⟨⟨[],0⟩,[],0,[]⟩ if out of range), then serScriptCode scscsc if k=nInk = nInk=nIn else the single byte 0x00, then the 4-byte sequence of input kkk — replaced by 4 zero bytes if k≠nInk \neq nInk=nIn and the low five bits of hththt are 222 (NONE) or 333 (SINGLE); the output count (000 for NONE, nIn+1nIn + 1nIn+1 for SINGLE, else ∣t.vout∣|t.\text{vout}|∣t.vout∣) and the corresponding serTxOut records (value as 8-byte two's complement, then the script with compact-size prefix; ⟨−1,[ ]⟩\langle -1,[\,]\rangle⟨−1,[]⟩ for non-nInnInnIn outputs in SINGLE mode and for out-of-range indices); and t.nLockTimet.\text{nLockTime}t.nLockTime (4 bytes). The scriptSig and witness fields of inputs are never read. Since hhh equates every field that is read, position by position, the two byte strings and hence the two hashes agree.

What is not said. The statement does not say the converse (equal hashes do not imply sameSkeleton). It does not say the hash is independent of scriptCodescriptCodescriptCode, nInnInnIn or hashTypehashTypehashType — these are held fixed. It does not say that scriptSigs or witnesses are the only fields that may differ; it says that if everything in the skeleton agrees then the hashes agree. It does not bound hashTypehashTypehashType or nInnInnIn. It does not address the uint256One special case specially: both sides merely agree on whether they hit it. It does not say anything about the BIP143 hash, nor about signature verification.

Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 26, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by pitimespi · Oct 26, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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