Theorem 1 — every characteristic function game has a unique fair allocation rule
ProvedCooperationGraphs.FairRule.theorem_1cooperation-graphscooperative-gamesp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Let be a finite set of players and a game in characteristic function form. There is a unique function satisfying the efficiency condition
and the equity condition
This is the paper's main result: the requirement that every connected group of cooperating players divides exactly its own worth, and that the two endpoints of any link gain equally from it, pins down a single allocation for every cooperation structure.
Formalization Note. The paper assumes a nonempty player set, stated as . Graphs are SimpleGraph (Fin n); a game is a function on Finset (Fin n) whose value at is never read. The paper's is nonempty; for the statement holds trivially, so no nonemptiness hypothesis is needed.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_CooperationGraphs_FairRule_Basic
Formal statement
namespace CooperationGraphs.FairRule
open Finset
open scoped Classical
/-- Theorem 1 (p. 7): every characteristic function game `v` has a unique fair allocation rule,
i.e. a unique `Y : GR → ℝ^N` satisfying (7) and (10). -/
theorem theorem_1 {n : ℕ} (hn : 0 < n) (v : Game n) : ∃! Y : Rule n, IsFair v Y := by sorry
end CooperationGraphs.FairRule
Source
Myerson, Graphs and Cooperation in Games, Discussion Paper No. 246 (Sept. 1976), Theorem 1, p. 7
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.