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Theorem 1 — every characteristic function game has a unique fair allocation rule

Proved
CooperationGraphs.FairRule.theorem_1

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

cooperation-graphscooperative-gamesp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Let NNN be a finite set of players and v∈RCLv\in\mathbb R^{CL}v∈RCL a game in characteristic function form. There is a unique function Y:GR→RNY:GR\to\mathbb R^NY:GR→RN satisfying the efficiency condition

∑n∈SYn(g)=vSfor all g∈GR, S∈N/g,(7)\sum_{n\in S}Y_n(g)=v_S\qquad\text{for all } g\in GR,\ S\in N/g,\tag{7}n∈S∑​Yn​(g)=vS​for all g∈GR, S∈N/g,(7)

and the equity condition

Yn(g)−Yn(g∖n:m)=Ym(g)−Ym(g∖n:m)for all g∈GR, n:m∈g.(10)Y_n(g)-Y_n(g\setminus n{:}m)=Y_m(g)-Y_m(g\setminus n{:}m)\qquad\text{for all } g\in GR,\ n{:}m\in g.\tag{10}Yn​(g)−Yn​(g∖n:m)=Ym​(g)−Ym​(g∖n:m)for all g∈GR, n:m∈g.(10)

This is the paper's main result: the requirement that every connected group of cooperating players divides exactly its own worth, and that the two endpoints of any link gain equally from it, pins down a single allocation for every cooperation structure.

Formalization Note. The paper assumes a nonempty player set, stated as 0<n0<n0<n. Graphs are SimpleGraph (Fin n); a game is a function on Finset (Fin n) whose value at ∅\emptyset∅ is never read. The paper's NNN is nonempty; for N=∅N=\emptysetN=∅ the statement holds trivially, so no nonemptiness hypothesis is needed.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_CooperationGraphs_FairRule_Basic
Formal statement
namespace CooperationGraphs.FairRule

open Finset
open scoped Classical

/-- Theorem 1 (p. 7): every characteristic function game `v` has a unique fair allocation rule,
i.e. a unique `Y : GR → ℝ^N` satisfying (7) and (10). -/
theorem theorem_1 {n : ℕ} (hn : 0 < n) (v : Game n) : ∃! Y : Rule n, IsFair v Y := by sorry

end CooperationGraphs.FairRule
Source
Myerson, Graphs and Cooperation in Games, Discussion Paper No. 246 (Sept. 1976), Theorem 1, p. 7
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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