§3.5, p. 14 — every potential maximizer is a Nash equilibrium of the stage-2 subgame
ProvedNetworkQuality.PotentialMax.potMax_isNashequilibrium-selectionnetwork-effectsp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1potential-game
In the network market under the standing assumptions, let and let maximize the potential over all buyer sets:
Then is a (pure-strategy) Nash equilibrium of the stage-2 subgame at : no buyer gains by not buying and no non-buyer gains by buying.
This is the statement that potential maximization refines Nash equilibrium in this game, which licenses using the potential maximizer as the predicted stage-2 outcome.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_NetworkQuality_PotentialMax_Setting
Formal statement
namespace NetworkQuality.PotentialMax
open Market
theorem potMax_isNash {n : ℕ} (M : Market n) (hM : M.Standing) (B : Finset (Fin n)) (p q : ℝ)
(hB : M.IsPotMax B p q) : M.IsNash B p q := by sorry
end NetworkQuality.PotentialMax
Source
Chan, Quality Strategies in Network Markets, SSRN 4203818 (version of April 2023), p. 14, §3.5, paragraph after (11)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.