Theorem 14.1 (first part): under the wholesale price contract iff
ProvedSupplyChainTheory.wholesale_coordinationTheorem 14.1, first part. Under the wholesale price contract with price , the retailer's and supplier's optimal order quantities both coincide with the supply-chain-optimal quantity if and only if
Coordination is stated as the equality of the sets of maximizers: every maximizer of is a maximizer of and conversely, and the same for . The proof substitutes into the first-order conditions (14.11)-(14.12) and uses that is strictly decreasing and continuous, so the fractile equations have a common unique solution. This is double marginalization (Spengler 1950): only a price below the supplier's cost aligns the retailer's fractile with the chain's.
Formalization Note is assumed continuous (an atomless demand law), (the book's proof divides by it), and the chain optimum positive, . Strict monotonicity of is not assumed. On all of it would exclude every nonnegative demand law, since on , and so the book's own setting. It is not needed either: with the maximizer sets compared as sets, at all three sets are , and for the retailer's set is disjoint from the chain's, which is nonempty.
import Definitions.Def_SupplyChainTheory_contracts
namespace SupplyChainTheory
theorem wholesale_coordination (P : ContractData) (D : MeasureTheory.Measure ℝ) [MeasureTheory.IsProbabilityMeasure D]
[MeasureTheory.NullSingletonClass D] (hD : MeasureTheory.Integrable (fun x => x) D)
(hps : 0 < P.ps) (hQ0 : (P.c - P.v) / (P.r - P.v + P.p) < 1 - ProbabilityTheory.cdf D 0) (w : ℝ) :
((∀ Q, IsMaxOn (retailerProfit P D (wholesaleTransfer w)) Set.univ Q
↔ IsMaxOn (chainProfit P D) Set.univ Q)
∧ (∀ Q, IsMaxOn (supplierProfit P D (wholesaleTransfer w)) Set.univ Q
↔ IsMaxOn (chainProfit P D) Set.univ Q))
↔ w = wholesaleCoordPrice P := by sorry
end SupplyChainTheory
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.