Lemma 2 — dominant actions for the manufacturer
ProvedCollabProject.TimeDep.lemma_2_manufacturerdominant-strategyp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1project-managementrisk-sharing
In the two-firm serial project with time-dependent delay penalties, suppose Assumption 1(b) and Condition 2 hold. If the manufacturer's saving is below its first-period penalty share , keeping its task duration gives it a strictly higher payoff than delaying, whether the supplier keeps or delays. If exceeds its second-period share , delaying gives it a strictly higher payoff after either supplier action.
This identifies the two manufacturer classes whose responses are independent of the supplier's move.
Formalization Note Positive savings are explicit in the shared standing predicate, following the paper's cost interpretation.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_CollabProject_TimeDep_Model
Formal statement
namespace CollabProject.TimeDep
/-- Lemma 2, manufacturer clause: the low-saving and high-saving types have
strictly dominant keep and delay actions, respectively. -/
theorem lemma_2_manufacturer (S : SType) (M : MType)
(h : Standing S M) :
(M.s0 < M.p10 → ∀ a1 : Act, u0 M a1 .delay < u0 M a1 .keep) ∧
(M.p20 < M.s0 → ∀ a1 : Act, u0 M a1 .keep < u0 M a1 .delay) := by sorry
end CollabProject.TimeDep
Source
Song, Zhao & Xu, Incentives and Gaming in Collaborative Projects under Risk Sharing Partnerships, SSRN preprint (abstract 2980139, PDF of 2019-10-14; published in Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2020), p. 12 (PDF 12), Lemma 2, manufacturer clauses; proof, Appendix p. 1 (PDF 33)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.