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Blocks accepted at different post-BIP34 heights have different coinbase scriptSigs

Proved
BitcoinUniqueness.coinbases_distinct

by pitimespi · Oct 29, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bip30bip34bitcoinbitcoin-mainnetcoinbaseconsensusformal-verificationuniqueness

For two reachable states at next heights h1≠h2h_1 \ne h_2h1​=h2​, both ≥227,931\ge 227{,}931≥227,931 and <231< 2^{31}<231, and blocks accepted on them: the coinbase scriptSigs differ. Each starts with its own height push, and if both pushes were prefixes of the same bytes the shorter would prefix the longer, forcing equal heights.

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinUniqueness
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinSer
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinHeader
open BitcoinUniqueness BitcoinSer BitcoinBlockV2
Formal statement
theorem BitcoinUniqueness.coinbases_distinct (S₁ S₂ : ChainState) (b₁ b₂ : BitcoinSer.Block) (now₁ now₂ : Int)
    (S₁' S₂' : ChainState) (undo₁ undo₂ : BlockUndo)
    (hR₁ : BitcoinBlockV2.Reachable S₁) (hR₂ : BitcoinBlockV2.Reachable S₂)
    (h₁ : BitcoinBlockV2.validate S₁ b₁ now₁ = .accept S₁' undo₁) (h₂ : BitcoinBlockV2.validate S₂ b₂ now₂ = .accept S₂' undo₂)
    (h34₁ : BitcoinHeader.BIP34Height ≤ S₁.nextHeight) (h34₂ : BitcoinHeader.BIP34Height ≤ S₂.nextHeight)
    (hlt₁ : S₁.nextHeight < 2 ^ 31) (hlt₂ : S₂.nextHeight < 2 ^ 31) (hne : S₁.nextHeight ≠ S₂.nextHeight) :
    BitcoinUniqueness.coinbaseScriptSig b₁ ≠ BitcoinUniqueness.coinbaseScriptSig b₂ := by sorry
Source
Bitcoin Core a773e1e33b349dc819b5a0edc1c7a4839dc73b48: ConnectBlock (fEnforceBIP30, BIP34_IMPLIES_BIP30_LIMIT), ContextualCheckBlock (the BIP34 height push), src/validation.cpp: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/a773e1e33b349dc819b5a0edc1c7a4839dc73b48/src/validation.cpp; CScript::push_int64, CScriptNum::serialize (script/script.h); BIP30, BIP34
Read-back

What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-fable-5-1 (independent sub-agent, blind: Lean code + auditor instructions only)

Read-back: BitcoinUniqueness.coinbases_distinct

Statement. For all chain states S1,S2S_1, S_2S1​,S2​, blocks b1,b2b_1, b_2b1​,b2​, integers t1,t2t_1, t_2t1​,t2​ (clock readings), chain states S1′,S2′S_1', S_2'S1′​,S2′​, and undo lists U1,U2U_1, U_2U1​,U2​, if

  • Reachable(S1)\mathrm{Reachable}(S_1)Reachable(S1​) and Reachable(S2)\mathrm{Reachable}(S_2)Reachable(S2​),
  • validate(S1,b1,t1)=accept(S1′,U1)\mathrm{validate}(S_1, b_1, t_1) = \mathrm{accept}(S_1', U_1)validate(S1​,b1​,t1​)=accept(S1′​,U1​) and validate(S2,b2,t2)=accept(S2′,U2)\mathrm{validate}(S_2, b_2, t_2) = \mathrm{accept}(S_2', U_2)validate(S2​,b2​,t2​)=accept(S2′​,U2​),
  • 227,931≤∣S1.headers∣227{,}931 \le |S_1.\mathrm{headers}|227,931≤∣S1​.headers∣ and 227,931≤∣S2.headers∣227{,}931 \le |S_2.\mathrm{headers}|227,931≤∣S2​.headers∣,
  • ∣S1.headers∣<231|S_1.\mathrm{headers}| < 2^{31}∣S1​.headers∣<231 and ∣S2.headers∣<231|S_2.\mathrm{headers}| < 2^{31}∣S2​.headers∣<231, and
  • ∣S1.headers∣≠∣S2.headers∣|S_1.\mathrm{headers}| \ne |S_2.\mathrm{headers}|∣S1​.headers∣=∣S2​.headers∣,

then coinbaseScriptSig(b1)≠coinbaseScriptSig(b2)\mathrm{coinbaseScriptSig}(b_1) \ne \mathrm{coinbaseScriptSig}(b_2)coinbaseScriptSig(b1​)=coinbaseScriptSig(b2​) (the two byte strings are not equal).

Formally, with Hi:=∣Si.headers∣H_i := |S_i.\mathrm{headers}|Hi​:=∣Si​.headers∣:

∀S1S2 b1b2 t1t2 S1′S2′ U1U2,  ⋀i=1,2(Reachable(Si)∧validate(Si,bi,ti)=accept(Si′,Ui)∧227931≤Hi<231)∧H1≠H2⟹coinbaseScriptSig(b1)≠coinbaseScriptSig(b2).\forall S_1 S_2\, b_1 b_2\, t_1 t_2\, S_1' S_2'\, U_1 U_2,\ \ \bigwedge_{i=1,2}\Big(\mathrm{Reachable}(S_i) \wedge \mathrm{validate}(S_i,b_i,t_i)=\mathrm{accept}(S_i',U_i) \wedge 227931 \le H_i < 2^{31}\Big) \wedge H_1 \ne H_2 \Longrightarrow \mathrm{coinbaseScriptSig}(b_1) \ne \mathrm{coinbaseScriptSig}(b_2).∀S1​S2​b1​b2​t1​t2​S1′​S2′​U1​U2​,  i=1,2⋀​(Reachable(Si​)∧validate(Si​,bi​,ti​)=accept(Si′​,Ui​)∧227931≤Hi​<231)∧H1​=H2​⟹coinbaseScriptSig(b1​)=coinbaseScriptSig(b2​).

What coinbaseScriptSig says

coinbaseScriptSig(b)\mathrm{coinbaseScriptSig}(b)coinbaseScriptSig(b) is the scriptSig (a byte string) of the first input of the first transaction of b.vtxb.\mathrm{vtx}b.vtx, with two fallbacks: if b.vtxb.\mathrm{vtx}b.vtx is empty, the fixed genesis coinbase transaction stands in for the first transaction (its scriptSig is a fixed 77-byte string); if that transaction has no inputs, a default input with empty scriptSig stands in, giving the empty string.

What the acceptance hypothesis says

validate(S,b,t)=accept(S′,U)\mathrm{validate}(S, b, t) = \mathrm{accept}(S', U)validate(S,b,t)=accept(S′,U) asserts that the four stages below all succeed and that S′S'S′ and UUU are exactly the state and undo list they produce. Write h:=b.headerh := b.\mathrm{header}h:=b.header, H:=∣S.headers∣H := |S.\mathrm{headers}|H:=∣S.headers∣ (the next height), tip\mathrm{tip}tip for the last element of S.headersS.\mathrm{headers}S.headers (the fixed genesis header if the list is empty), tipHeight:=H−˙1\mathrm{tipHeight} := H \mathbin{\dot{-}} 1tipHeight:=H−˙​1 (truncated subtraction, so 000 when H=0H = 0H=0), and cb\mathrm{cb}cb for the first transaction of b.vtxb.\mathrm{vtx}b.vtx (the fixed genesis coinbase transaction if b.vtxb.\mathrm{vtx}b.vtx is empty). A transaction "is a coinbase" iff it has exactly one input and that input's previous outpoint is (32 zero bytes,0xffffffff)(32\text{ zero bytes}, \mathtt{0xffffffff})(32 zero bytes,0xffffffff).

  1. Header stage. hhh passes the proof-of-work test of the imported proof-of-work development (its double-SHA-256 hash, read as a little-endian 256-bit number, against the 32-bit field h.bitsh.\mathrm{bits}h.bits); h.prevBlockh.\mathrm{prevBlock}h.prevBlock equals the header hash of tip\mathrm{tip}tip (otherwise the outcome is "missing previous", not accept); the 32-bit value of h.bitsh.\mathrm{bits}h.bits equals the required work computed from SSS by the imported difficulty rule; the median time past of SSS at tipHeight\mathrm{tipHeight}tipHeight is strictly less than h.timeh.\mathrm{time}h.time; h.time≤t+7200h.\mathrm{time} \le t + 7200h.time≤t+7200 (otherwise the outcome is "future time", not accept); and it is not the case that (h.version<2h.\mathrm{version} < 2h.version<2 and 227931≤tipHeight+1227931 \le \mathrm{tipHeight}+1227931≤tipHeight+1), nor (h.version<3h.\mathrm{version} < 3h.version<3 and 363725≤tipHeight+1363725 \le \mathrm{tipHeight}+1363725≤tipHeight+1), nor (h.version<4h.\mathrm{version} < 4h.version<4 and 388381≤tipHeight+1388381 \le \mathrm{tipHeight}+1388381≤tipHeight+1).

  2. Context-free block stage. The proof-of-work test again; the Merkle root computed from the txids of b.vtxb.\mathrm{vtx}b.vtx equals h.merkleRooth.\mathrm{merkleRoot}h.merkleRoot and the Merkle computation reports no mutation; b.vtxb.\mathrm{vtx}b.vtx is non-empty; 4⋅∣b.vtx∣≤4,000,0004\cdot|b.\mathrm{vtx}| \le 4{,}000{,}0004⋅∣b.vtx∣≤4,000,000 and 4⋅(length of the witness-stripped serialization of b)≤4,000,0004\cdot(\text{length of the witness-stripped serialization of } b) \le 4{,}000{,}0004⋅(length of the witness-stripped serialization of b)≤4,000,000; cb\mathrm{cb}cb is a coinbase and no other transaction of bbb is; every transaction has non-empty inputs and outputs, witness-stripped size times 4 at most 4,000,0004{,}000{,}0004,000,000, every output value in [0,2.1×1015][0, 2.1\times 10^{15}][0,2.1×1015] with running totals in that range, pairwise distinct previous outpoints, and (for a coinbase) a first-input scriptSig of length between 222 and 100100100 inclusive, or (for a non-coinbase) no null previous outpoint; and 4⋅∑4\cdot\sum4⋅∑ of the legacy signature-operation counts is at most 80,00080{,}00080,000.

  3. Contextual stage. Every transaction of bbb is final at height HHH against a cutoff (the median time past of SSS if 419328≤tipHeight+1419328 \le \mathrm{tipHeight}+1419328≤tipHeight+1, else h.timeh.\mathrm{time}h.time); if 227931≤tipHeight+1227931 \le \mathrm{tipHeight}+1227931≤tipHeight+1 then heightScript(H)\mathrm{heightScript}(H)heightScript(H) is a prefix of the scriptSig of the first input of cb\mathrm{cb}cb (the first input being the default input with empty scriptSig if cb\mathrm{cb}cb has no inputs) — this byte string is literally the same expression as coinbaseScriptSig(b)\mathrm{coinbaseScriptSig}(b)coinbaseScriptSig(b); the witness-malleation check passes with the expectation flag set iff 481824≤tipHeight+1481824 \le \mathrm{tipHeight}+1481824≤tipHeight+1; and the block weight (3×3\times3× stripped size +++ full size) is at most 4,000,0004{,}000{,}0004,000,000.

  4. Connect stage. Let η:=headerHash(h)\eta := \mathrm{headerHash}(h)η:=headerHash(h). If η\etaη equals the fixed genesis block hash GGG (32 bytes beginning 6f e2 8c 0a\mathtt{6f\,e2\,8c\,0a}6fe28c0a), the stage succeeds immediately with ledger S.utxoS.\mathrm{utxo}S.utxo and empty undo list, performing no further check. Otherwise: if bip30Checked(S,H,η)=true\mathrm{bip30Checked}(S,H,\eta) = \mathtt{true}bip30Checked(S,H,η)=true (see the ScanRuns unfolding) and it is not the case that for every tx∈b.vtx\mathrm{tx} \in b.\mathrm{vtx}tx∈b.vtx and every o<∣tx.vout∣o < |\mathrm{tx}.\mathrm{vout}|o<∣tx.vout∣ the ledger S.utxoS.\mathrm{utxo}S.utxo has no entry keyed (txid(tx),o)(\mathrm{txid}(\mathrm{tx}), o)(txid(tx),o), the stage fails; otherwise the transactions are processed in order through the imported per-transaction loop (input lookup and maturity, fee range, sequence locks, sigop budget, full script verification, ledger update), which must succeed, and finally the output value of cb\mathrm{cb}cb must be at most the accumulated fees plus the subsidy at height HHH.

On success, S′=(S.headers+ ⁣ ⁣+[h], u)S' = \big(S.\mathrm{headers} \mathbin{+\!\!+} [h],\ u\big)S′=(S.headers++[h], u) where uuu is the ledger produced by stage 4, and UUU is the undo list produced by stage 4. In particular ∣S′.headers∣=H+1|S'.\mathrm{headers}| = H + 1∣S′.headers∣=H+1.

What reachability says

Reachable(S)\mathrm{Reachable}(S)Reachable(S) is the least predicate such that (i) the initial state ([genesis header], [ ])\big([\text{genesis header}],\ [\,]\big)([genesis header], []) (one header, empty ledger) is reachable, and (ii) whenever S0S_0S0​ is reachable and validate(S0,b0,t0)=accept(S1,U0)\mathrm{validate}(S_0, b_0, t_0) = \mathrm{accept}(S_1, U_0)validate(S0​,b0​,t0​)=accept(S1​,U0​) for some block b0b_0b0​, integer t0t_0t0​ and undo list U0U_0U0​, then S1S_1S1​ is reachable. So Reachable(S)\mathrm{Reachable}(S)Reachable(S) means SSS arises from the initial state by a finite sequence of accepted validations, each with its own arbitrary clock reading.

Edge cases and scope

  • The two chain states are related by no hypothesis: they need not share any header, need not be on the same chain, and need not be each other's ancestor; the only link between the two halves is H1≠H2H_1 \ne H_2H1​=H2​.
  • The two clock readings t1,t2t_1, t_2t1​,t2​ are independent and arbitrary.
  • The conclusion compares only the first-input scriptSig of the first transaction of each block (with the fallbacks of coinbaseScriptSig\mathrm{coinbaseScriptSig}coinbaseScriptSig, which the validation hypotheses' stage 2 prevents from being exercised). It says nothing about txids, about the rest of the coinbase transaction, or about blocks at the same height on different chains (H1=H2H_1 = H_2H1​=H2​ is excluded by hypothesis, so nothing is claimed about it).
  • The heights are lengths of header lists of the pre-block states, bounded below by 227,931227{,}931227,931 and strictly above by 2312^{31}231.
  • S1′,S2′,U1,U2S_1', S_2', U_1, U_2S1′​,S2′​,U1​,U2​ appear only in the acceptance hypotheses.
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 29, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by pitimespi · Oct 29, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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