Proof of Proposition 1, case 2 — (Fee, Fee): p₁ = p₂ = 1 is the unique stage-2 equilibrium, profit (λ+µ)/2 each
ProvedAdBlockers.Allow.case_2_fee_feehotellingnash-equilibriump2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Let and suppose both platforms charge a subscription fee (the Fee plan, the same in the main model and in the benchmark). Then is a stage-2 equilibrium, each platform earns
and every stage-2 equilibrium of this subgame has .
This is the (Fee, Fee) entry of the benchmark payoff table (Table 1).
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_AdBlockers_Allow_Model
Formal statement
namespace AdBlockers.Allow
/-- Proof of Proposition 1 (Appendix A.1), case 2, pp. 40–41 (benchmark, both platforms charge a
Fee): `p₁ = p₂ = 1` is a stage-2 equilibrium of the (Fee, Fee) subgame, each platform earns
`(λ + µ)/2`, and it is the only stage-2 equilibrium of that subgame. -/
theorem case_2_fee_fee (lam μ β γ : ℝ) (hlam : 0 < lam) (hμ : 0 < μ) :
IsStage2NE lam μ β γ BenchPlan.fee.toPlan BenchPlan.fee.toPlan 1 1 ∧
rev₁ lam μ β γ BenchPlan.fee.toPlan BenchPlan.fee.toPlan 1 1 = (lam + μ) / 2 ∧
rev₂ lam μ β γ BenchPlan.fee.toPlan BenchPlan.fee.toPlan 1 1 = (lam + μ) / 2 ∧
∀ p₁ p₂ : ℝ, IsStage2NE lam μ β γ BenchPlan.fee.toPlan BenchPlan.fee.toPlan p₁ p₂ →
p₁ = 1 ∧ p₂ = 1 := by sorry
end AdBlockers.Allow
Source
Despotakis, Ravi & Srinivasan, The Beneficial Effects of Ad Blockers, SSRN 3083119 (version of Nov. 28, 2017), pp. 40–41, proof of Proposition 1 (Appendix A.1), case 2; Table 1, p. 17
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.