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Lemma 3, p. 12 (PDF 13) — the FW subgame-perfect equilibrium: wage (8) and price (9)

Disproved
SharingPlatform.WageSchemes.lemma_3

by mikedeng1 · Oct 19, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

p2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1platform-competitionsubgame-perfect-equilibriumwage-schemes

Consider the fixed-wage game: in stage 1 the platforms announce wages w1,w2∈Rw_1, w_2 \in \mathbb Rw1​,w2​∈R, in stage 2 they set prices, and profit is (pi−wi)max⁡{0,min⁡{di,si}}(p_i - w_i)\max\{0,\min\{d_i,s_i\}\}(pi​−wi​)max{0,min{di​,si​}}. Assume the standing assumptions, including Assumption 2, l≤2c+c2/bl \le 2c + c^2/bl≤2c+c2/b. Let

w∗=b[2a(l+m)+2ck+k(2l+3m)]+c[(a+2k)(l+m)+ck]b[2c(l+2m)+m(2l+3m)]+c[c(l+2m)+2m(l+m)],p∗=a+k−mw∗c.w^* = \frac{b[2a(l+m) + 2ck + k(2l+3m)] + c[(a+2k)(l+m) + ck]}{b[2c(l+2m) + m(2l+3m)] + c[c(l+2m) + 2m(l+m)]}, \qquad p^* = \frac{a + k - m w^*}{c}.w∗=b[2c(l+2m)+m(2l+3m)]+c[c(l+2m)+2m(l+m)]b[2a(l+m)+2ck+k(2l+3m)]+c[(a+2k)(l+m)+ck]​,p∗=ca+k−mw∗​.

Then:

  1. there is a symmetric, non-trivial subgame-perfect equilibrium whose stage-2 price rules are continuous at (w∗,w∗)(w^*, w^*)(w∗,w∗), in which both platforms announce w∗w^*w∗ and charge p∗p^*p∗;
  2. every symmetric, non-trivial subgame-perfect equilibrium whose stage-2 price rules are continuous at the equilibrium pair has wage w∗w^*w∗ and on-path price p∗p^*p∗.

This is the FW outcome of Proposition 3. Assumption 2 is what makes the pure-strategy equilibrium exist (p. 9 and A.5).

Formalization Note "Non-trivial" means positive on-path demand and supply (p. 9). Continuity of the stage-2 price rules at the equilibrium pair is the same regularity condition as in Lemma 2, imposed on both two-stage games alike. The appendix's own argument differentiates the subgame prices (50) in the wages.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_SharingPlatform_WageSchemes_Model
Formal statement
namespace SharingPlatform.WageSchemes

theorem lemma_3 (P : Params) (hP : P.Standing) :
    (∃ e : TwoStage, IsSPE P fwWage e ∧ e.OnPathContinuous ∧ e.IsSymmetric ∧
      e.Nontrivial P fwWage ∧ e.x₁ = wW P ∧ e.P₁ e.x₁ e.x₂ = pW P) ∧
    (∀ e : TwoStage, IsSPE P fwWage e → e.OnPathContinuous → e.IsSymmetric →
      e.Nontrivial P fwWage → e.x₁ = wW P ∧ e.P₁ e.x₁ e.x₂ = pW P) := by sorry
end SharingPlatform.WageSchemes
Source
Zhang, Chen, Raghunathan, Two-Sided Platform Competition in a Sharing Economy, SSRN 3555993, p. 12 (PDF 13), Lemma 3, Equations (8)–(9); proof A.5, pp. 43–46 (PDF 44–47)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 19, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 19, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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