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The Top Trading Cycle mechanism is strategy-proof (Roth)

Proved
AGT.ttc_strategyproof

by Shuze Chen · Sep 13, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

game-theorymarket-designmechanism-designstable-matching

The Top Trading Cycle mechanism is strategy-proof (Theorem 10.7 of Algorithmic Game Theory; Roth). Formally: let FFF be any mechanism that, on every profile of strict preferences, selects a core allocation — by Theorem 10.6 the core is a single point, the TTC outcome, so FFF is pinned down on valid profiles. Then no agent can misreport her ordering and receive a house she truly prefers: for every profile, every agent iii, and every alternative strict ordering, the house FFF gives iii after the misreport either equals or is truly-worse than the house FFF gives her under truth.

A note on the rendering. Stating the theorem for every core-selecting FFF, with the misreport quantified after FFF, is what makes it a statement about the mechanism rather than about one run of an algorithm; nothing is chosen with hindsight.

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_agt_matching
Formal statement
namespace AGT

/-- The Top Trading Cycle mechanism is strategy-proof (Theorem 10.7 of
*Algorithmic Game Theory*; Roth).  Formally: any mechanism selecting, on
every profile of strict preferences, the unique core allocation (Theorem
10.6 — the TTC outcome) leaves no agent able to obtain a house they truly
prefer by misreporting their ordering. -/
theorem ttc_strategyproof {N : Type*} [Fintype N] [DecidableEq N]
    (F : (N → N → N → Prop) → N ≃ N)
    (hF : ∀ P, IsPrefProfile P → ¬ HouseBlocked P (F P)) :
    ∀ P, IsPrefProfile P → ∀ i (r' : N → N → Prop),
      IsStrictTotalOrder N r' →
        F (Function.update P i r') i = F P i ∨
          P i (F P i) (F (Function.update P i r') i) := by
  sorry

end AGT
Source
N. Nisan, T. Roughgarden, E. Tardos, V. V. Vazirani (eds.), Algorithmic Game Theory, Cambridge University Press 2007, https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511800481, Section 10.3, Theorem 10.7, p. 255
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What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-fable-5

Read-back: ttc_strategyproof

Setting. Let NNN be a finite type with decidable equality (possibly empty). A "profile" assigns to each i∈Ni \in Ni∈N a binary relation on NNN (write Pi(x,y)P_i(x,y)Pi​(x,y) when iii's relation holds of the ordered pair (x,y)(x,y)(x,y)); an "allocation" is a bijection N→NN \to NN→N (a Lean Equiv). The theorem is about an arbitrary given function

F:{families of binary relations on N indexed by N}⟶{bijections N≃N}.F : \{\text{families of binary relations on } N \text{ indexed by } N\} \longrightarrow \{\text{bijections } N \simeq N\}.F:{families of binary relations on N indexed by N}⟶{bijections N≃N}.

FFF is total: it is defined on every family of relations, including families that are not preference profiles; no construction of FFF (such as a top-trading-cycles algorithm) appears in the statement — FFF is characterized only by the hypothesis below.

Hypothesis hFh_FhF​. For every profile PPP such that each PiP_iPi​ is a strict total order on NNN (trichotomous, irreflexive, transitive), the allocation F(P)F(P)F(P) is unblocked — unfolding the custom predicate HouseBlocked, this means: there do not exist a nonempty set S⊆NS \subseteq NS⊆N and a bijection τ:N→N\tau : N \to Nτ:N→N with τ(S)⊆S\tau(S) \subseteq Sτ(S)⊆S, such that every i∈Si \in Si∈S has τ(i)=F(P)(i)\tau(i) = F(P)(i)τ(i)=F(P)(i) or Pi(τ(i),F(P)(i))P_i\big(\tau(i), F(P)(i)\big)Pi​(τ(i),F(P)(i)), and at least one i∈Si \in Si∈S has Pi(τ(i),F(P)(i))P_i\big(\tau(i), F(P)(i)\big)Pi​(τ(i),F(P)(i)). (Only pref profiles are constrained; FFF's values on other inputs are arbitrary.)

Conclusion. For every profile PPP with each PiP_iPi​ a strict total order, for every agent i∈Ni \in Ni∈N, and for every binary relation r′r'r′ on NNN that is a strict total order, letting P′:=P[i↦r′]P' := P[i \mapsto r']P′:=P[i↦r′] denote the profile that agrees with PPP at every agent except iii, where the relation is replaced by r′r'r′:

F(P′)(i)=F(P)(i)orPi(F(P)(i), F(P′)(i)).F(P')(i) = F(P)(i) \quad \text{or} \quad P_i\Big( F(P)(i),\ F(P')(i) \Big).F(P′)(i)=F(P)(i)orPi​(F(P)(i), F(P′)(i)).

That is: the object agent iii receives when the profile carries r′r'r′ in iii's slot equals the object iii receives under PPP; or iii's original relation PiP_iPi​ holds of the ordered pair (object under PPP, object under P′P'P′). The disjunction is inclusive. The comparison always uses PiP_iPi​, never r′r'r′; r′r'r′ enters only through the deviated profile P′P'P′ handed to FFF.

Points to note.

  • The quantifier order is: profile PPP first, then agent iii and alternative relation r′r'r′ — so the claim covers every unilateral replacement at every agent of every strict-total-order profile.
  • The conclusion is the literal disjunction displayed above, not the (formally different) statement "¬ Pi(F(P′)(i),F(P)(i))\neg\, P_i\big(F(P')(i), F(P)(i)\big)¬Pi​(F(P′)(i),F(P)(i))"; the exact form asserted is equal outcome or truthful outcome PiP_iPi​-related above the deviation outcome.
  • Nothing constrains what happens to agents other than iii under P′P'P′, and nothing is asserted for relations r′r'r′ that fail to be strict total orders, nor for base profiles PPP that fail to be preference profiles.
  • Degenerate cases: if NNN is empty, the conclusion quantifies over no agents and holds vacuously (and hFh_FhF​ is about the unique empty bijection, unblocked because no nonempty SSS exists). If hFh_FhF​ is unsatisfiable for a given FFF, the theorem holds vacuously for that FFF; the statement asserts the implication for every FFF of the displayed type.
Human review
  • Endorsed by Community (Bot) · Sep 13, 2026

  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Sep 13, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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