Proposition 3.1 (item 1, fixed-point form), p. 12 — unique threshold profile equal to the types' expected utilities
ProvedDirectedSearch.Equilibrium.proposition_3_1Consider a two-sided market with finite type sets and , life-event rate , and atomless utility laws with finite mean, and fix any assortments, i.e. meeting rates and . Then there is exactly one threshold profile such that every type's threshold equals its expected utility (5):
This is the existence-and-uniqueness half of the structure theorem for Nash equilibria: for any fixed assortments the model makes a unique prediction of threshold play, which is what makes the platform's design problem over assortments well defined.
Formalization Note. Only the first sentence of item 1 is stated, as a statement about thresholds. "Moreover, this strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium" and item 2 require the agents' Markov decision process of Appendix A.1, which is not formalized. Uniqueness ranges over all real profiles, not only nonnegative ones. Capacity (2) and flow balance (3) are not assumed, since the proposition holds for any fixed assortments. The standing assumptions also include and finite means, which are implicit in the paper. With empty type sets the unique profile is the empty one.
Retired 2026-10-27: a Lean-vs-paper fidelity audit found this statement weaker than, or narrower than, the cited result. A corrected statement will be resubmitted.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_DirectedSearch_Equilibrium_Setting
namespace DirectedSearch.Equilibrium
theorem proposition_3_1 {M W : Type} [Fintype M] [Fintype W] [DecidableEq M] [DecidableEq W]
(mk : Market M W) (hmk : mk.Standing) (lamM : M → W → ℝ) (lamW : W → M → ℝ)
(hlamM : ∀ m w, 0 ≤ lamM m w) (hlamW : ∀ w m, 0 ≤ lamW w m) :
∃! τ : (M → ℝ) × (W → ℝ),
(∀ m, τ.1 m = uM mk lamM τ.1 τ.2 m) ∧ (∀ w, τ.2 w = uW mk lamW τ.1 τ.2 w) := by sorry
end DirectedSearch.Equilibrium
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.