Theorem 4.13 — weak Pareto optimality in the sell- direction
OpenSybilClinch.Supplement.theorem_4_13automated-market-makerclinching-auctionmechanism-designp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1sybil-proofness
Let an admissible AMM have initial spot price , and let a finite profile consist of truthful eligible sell- bids with . For every completed run of the one-sided AMM clinching mechanism, write for identity 's terminal allocation of and payment of .
The resulting outcome is weakly Pareto optimal in both clauses of Definition 2.7:
- no subset of eligible users can perform a feasible internal retrade of their post-batch holdings that weakly improves every user's utility and strictly improves at least one;
- no eligible user can strictly improve its utility through an additional sell--direction trade with the pool from the settled terminal reserve state.
Differences from the source:
- encoding: one-sided terminal allocation/payment → the published two-direction
Fillwithsold = y_i,recv = x_i, and a sell-Report; reason: this is exactly the sell- branch of Definition 2.7 and changes no outcome - encoding: finite real one-sided values →
WithTop ℝvalues with an explicit non-top hypothesis anduntopDonly after that hypothesis; reason: the published one-sided run representation also serves the reverse auction, whose infinite values are excluded here as the paper requires
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_SybilClinch_AdmissibleAMM_C import Definitions.Def_SybilClinch_AdmissibleAMM_p0 import Definitions.Def_SybilClinch_chordMech import Definitions.Def_SybilClinch_IsRun import Definitions.Def_SybilClinch_OneSidedProfile_Valid import Definitions.Def_SybilClinch_Run_pay import Definitions.Def_SybilClinch_WeakPO set_option autoImplicit false open Filter Topology Set MeasureTheory
Formal statement
namespace SybilClinch
namespace Supplement
/-- Zhang, Li, Shi, Zhang, Xia, Han, *Sybil-Proofness of Generalized Adaptive Clinching and
Implications for Blockchain Mechanism Design*, arXiv:2610.36629 (held copy sha256
93c5d05b05cc8b80b5bb5c0ac677b9642e119277d82de797234b0242f7c5021c), Theorem 4.13
(Weak Pareto optimality in the sell-`Y` direction), printed p.20 (PDF p.22).
For every admissible AMM, the truthful completed one-sided clinching outcome on finite eligible
sell-`Y` reports is weakly Pareto optimal in both senses of Definition 2.7: it admits neither a
strictly improving internal retrade among eligible users nor a strictly improving same-direction
trade between one such user and the pool.
**Formalization Note.** A one-sided terminal allocation `xᵢ` and payment `yᵢ` are embedded in the
published two-direction outcome format as `Fill(sold := yᵢ, recv := xᵢ)`. Finite `WithTop` values
are read with `untopD`; the finiteness hypothesis ensures the default is never used on the profile. -/
theorem theorem_4_13 (A : AdmissibleAMM) (P : OneSidedProfile) (hP : P.Valid)
(hfin : ∀ i ∈ P.ids, P.v i ≠ ⊤)
(helig : ∀ i ∈ P.ids, (A.p0 : WithTop ℝ) ≤ P.v i) (R : Run)
(hR : IsRun (chordMech A.C A.p0 A.x0) P R) :
let rep : ℕ → Report := fun i =>
{ dir := Dir.sellY, val := (P.v i).untopD 0, bud := P.q i }
let f : ℕ → Fill := fun i =>
{ sold := R.pay (chordMech A.C A.p0 A.x0) i R.pf, recv := R.x i R.pf }
WeakPO A P.ids rep f := by sorry
end Supplement
end SybilClinch
Source
Zhang, Li, Shi, Zhang, Xia, Han, Sybil-Proofness of Generalized Adaptive Clinching and Implications for Blockchain Mechanism Design, arXiv:2610.36629 (held copy sha256 93c5d05b…), Theorem 4.13, printed p.20 (PDF p.22), in the setting of §3.1, printed p.8 (PDF p.10)