App. A.2(iii), p. 3353 — DS_H^D − DS_H^U = ½v²((b+θH)²/D² − (2b+3θH−θL)²/U²) > 0 iff b > b̂(θH, θL)
ProvedTwoSidedPD.Baseline.high_type_gain_iffp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1price-discriminationtwo-sided-marketswelfare
Consider the baseline two-sided platform with , and Assumption 1; write and . For every uniform-pricing optimum and every discrimination optimum, the surplus of high-type sellers satisfies
and
This is Proposition 2(iii).
Formalization Note. As for low-type sellers, the page prints the two fractions in the opposite order; the identity is stated with the fractions in the order that makes it true, and the paper's claim (iii) is unchanged. The square root is Real.sqrt; on the parameter region .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_TwoSidedPD_Baseline_Setting
Formal statement
namespace TwoSidedPD.Baseline
theorem high_type_gain_iff (v b θH θL : ℝ) (hL : 0 < θL) (hLH : θL < θH) (hb : 0 < b)
(hA : Assumption1 v b θH θL) :
∀ (x : ℝ × ℝ) (y : ℝ × ℝ × ℝ), IsUniformOpt v b θH θL x → IsDiscrOpt v b θH θL y →
sellerSurplusDH θH y - sellerSurplusU θH θH θL x =
1 / 2 * v ^ 2 * ((b + θH) ^ 2 / Dden b θH θL ^ 2 -
(2 * b + 3 * θH - θL) ^ 2 / Uden b θH θL ^ 2) ∧
(sellerSurplusU θH θH θL x < sellerSurplusDH θH y ↔ bhat θH θL < b) := by sorry
end TwoSidedPD.Baseline
Source
de Cornière, Mantovani & Shekhar, Third-Degree Price Discrimination in Two-Sided Markets, Management Science 71(4) (2025), p. 3353, App. A.2(iii), display DS^D_H − DS^U_H
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.