Eq. (8), p. 50 — without second-period sales the threshold is (p₁ + (1 + δ)c)/(1 + δσ) and the optimal first-period price is eq. (8)
ProvedGDPRDataMarkets.Benchmark.eq8_no_second_periodgdprp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1privacytwo-period-pricing
Consider the benchmark model under the standing assumptions , , , in the regime where no first-period non-buyer buys in period 2.
- Threshold. Let and . Buying in period 1 gives nonnegative expected utility,
if and only if
- Price. The first-period objective satisfies for all real , where
This is the first-period price of case B of Proposition 2 when .
Formalization Note. is a concave quadratic in , so the claim is global over . The expectation over is the average of the two types.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_GDPRDataMarkets_Benchmark_Model import Definitions.Def_GDPRDataMarkets_Benchmark_Reduced
Formal statement
namespace GDPRDataMarkets.Benchmark
theorem eq8_no_second_period (P : Params) (hS : P.Standing) :
(∀ (σ : Profile) (p1 v : ℝ), 0 ≤ v → σ.r v = (1 + P.mu - P.sigma) * v →
(0 ≤ U1buy P σ p1 v ↔ vN P p1 ≤ v)) ∧
(∀ p1 : ℝ, piN P p1 ≤ piN P (p8 P)) := by sorry
end GDPRDataMarkets.Benchmark
Source
Ke, Sudhir, Privacy Rights and Data Security: GDPR and Personal Data Markets, SSRN 3643979 (pdfTeX build 2022-09-14), p. 50, Appendix, proof of Proposition 2, eq. (8) and the display before it
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.