(15), p. 13 — the retailer's expected profit without sales information
ProvedSalesTrust.Sharing.eq_15p2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1repeated-gamesupply-chain
Under the standing assumptions, the retailer's expected per-period profit at the no-sharing menu of Proposition 1 is
and the first term is the static profit, .
This is the no-sharing side of the comparison in Proposition 3.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_SalesTrust_Sharing_Model
Formal statement
namespace SalesTrust.Sharing
/-- (15), p. 13: the retailer's expected profit at the no-sharing menu. -/
theorem eq_15 (P : Params) (hS : P.Standing) :
retailerProfit P (menuNE P) =
P.p * (P.VH - P.VL) * (P.VL - P.p * P.VH) / (2 * (1 - P.p)) +
P.δ * (1 - P.δ) * (P.p ^ 2 * (P.VH - P.VL) ^ 2 / (2 * (1 - P.p))) ∧
staticRent P = P.p * (P.VH - P.VL) * (P.VL - P.p * P.VH) / (2 * (1 - P.p)) := by sorry
end SalesTrust.Sharing
Source
Shamir & Yehezkel, Sales information transparency and trust in repeated vertical relationships, authors' manuscript (January 2023; MSOM, DOI 10.1287/msom.2023.1208), p. 13 (PDF 14), (15)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.