Proposition 4.7, p. 19 — neither full nor partial adoption is an equilibrium
ProvedPermBlockchain.Failure.proposition_4_7Consider the reduced-form blockchain supply chain under its standing assumptions. In the adoption game (8), where manufacturer chooses and receives
neither the full adoption profile ( for all ) nor the partial adoption profile ( exactly when ) is a pure Nash equilibrium.
Because price competition leaves no gross profit to recoup the adoption cost, an adopter always gains by withdrawing. This is the equilibrium half of the adoption failure of Proposition 4.8.
Formalization Note The gross profit is the constant in every subgame, the outcome of Proposition A.1 used in the paper's proof (p. 36); the signalling and pricing game behind Proposition A.1 is not formalized. Equilibrium is AGT.IsPureNash over unilateral switches of .
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_agt_games import Definitions.Def_PermBlockchain_Failure_Setting
namespace PermBlockchain.Failure
/-- **Proposition 4.7** (p. 19): neither full nor partial adoption is an equilibrium of the
adoption game (8). -/
theorem proposition_4_7 {m : ℕ} (M : Model m) (hM : M.Standing) :
¬ M.IsEquilibrium Scenario.F.profile ∧ ¬ M.IsEquilibrium Scenario.P.profile := by sorry
end PermBlockchain.Failure
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.