Proposition 4.3, p. 17 — manufacturer welfare:
ProvedPermBlockchain.Failure.proposition_4_3blockchainmanufacturer-welfarep2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Consider the reduced-form blockchain supply chain under its standing assumptions. The manufacturer welfare in the full, partial and non-adoption scenarios satisfies
Since price competition leaves every manufacturer with zero gross profit, adoption only adds the adoption costs ; the more manufacturers adopt, the lower their aggregate welfare.
Formalization Note The gross profit is the constant , the outcome of Proposition A.1 that the paper's proof of this proposition (p. 34) invokes; the paper's display (11) is read, as in that proof, at the scenario's fixed adoption profile.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_agt_games import Definitions.Def_PermBlockchain_Failure_Setting
Formal statement
namespace PermBlockchain.Failure
/-- **Proposition 4.3** (p. 17): manufacturer welfare satisfies `W^F_M < W^P_M < W^N_M`. -/
theorem proposition_4_3 {m : ℕ} (M : Model m) (hM : M.Standing) :
M.WM .F < M.WM .P ∧ M.WM .P < M.WM .N := by sorry
end PermBlockchain.Failure
Source
Iyengar, Saleh, Sethuraman, Wang, Economics of Permissioned Blockchain Adoption, SSRN 3602376 (version of 2022-08-19), p. 17, Proposition 4.3
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.