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Proof of Theorem 1 — correspondence with the auxiliary game

Proved
HartSchmeidler.Finite.aux_game_correspondence

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

correlated-equilibriumfinite-gamesp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1zero-sum-games

For the finite game described above, a lottery ppp on pure strategy profiles is a correlated equilibrium exactly when it guarantees player I a nonnegative expected payment against every lottery yyy over player II's triples (i,ri,ti)(i,r^i,t^i)(i,ri,ti):

p is a correlated equilibrium⟺p is a lottery and ∑s∈S∑cp(s)y(c)A(s,c)≥0 for every lottery y.p\text{ is a correlated equilibrium}\quad\Longleftrightarrow\quad p\text{ is a lottery and }\sum_{s\in S}\sum_{c}p(s)y(c)A(s,c)\ge0 \text{ for every lottery }y.p is a correlated equilibrium⟺p is a lottery and s∈S∑​c∑​p(s)y(c)A(s,c)≥0 for every lottery y.

Here A(s,c)A(s,c)A(s,c) is the auxiliary payment defined above. This equivalence links the incentive inequalities to the minimax step of the proof.

Formalization Note The triples form one finite strategy set for player II; yyy is one lottery over all triples, not a separate lottery for each player. When there are no players, that set is empty and both sides reduce to the requirement that ppp is a lottery.

Preamble
import Definitions.Def_HartSchmeidler_Finite_Game
Formal statement
namespace HartSchmeidler.Finite

open Finset

/-- Proof of Theorem 1, p. 19: condition (1) is precisely the guarantee that
player I's mixed strategy earns a nonnegative payoff against every mixed
strategy of player II in the auxiliary game. -/
theorem aux_game_correspondence {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]
    {S : ι → Type*} [∀ i, Fintype (S i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (S i)]
    [∀ i, Nonempty (S i)]
    (h : ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ) (p : (∀ i, S i) → ℝ) :
    IsCorrelatedEq h p ↔ AGT.IsLottery p ∧
      ∀ y : Deviation S → ℝ, AGT.IsLottery y →
        0 ≤ ∑ s, ∑ c, p s * y c * auxPayoff h s c := by sorry

end HartSchmeidler.Finite
Source
Hart and Schmeidler, Existence of Correlated Equilibria, Math. Oper. Res. 14 (1989), p. 19, proof of Theorem 1 (‘Consider the following auxiliary’); https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.14.1.18
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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