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Theorem 1′ — with indifference allowed, a strategy-proof voting procedure with ≥ 3 outcomes is dictatorial

Proved
StrategyProofArrow.WeakGS.theorem_1_prime

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

gibbard-satterthwaitep2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1social-choicestrategy-proofnessvotingweak-orders

Consider a committee of n≥2n\ge 2n≥2 individuals and a finite set SmS_mSm​ of alternatives in which every weak order (indifference allowed) is an admissible ballot. Let v:πmn→Smv:\pi_m^n\to S_mv:πmn​→Sm​ be a voting procedure whose range Tp=v(πmn)T_p=v(\pi_m^n)Tp​=v(πmn​) contains p≥3p\ge 3p≥3 alternatives (so m≥p≥3m\ge p\ge 3m≥p≥3). If vvv is strategy-proof, then vvv is dictatorial: there is an individual iii such that

v(B)  Bi  yfor every ballot set B∈πmn and every y∈Tp,v(B)\;B_i\;y\qquad\text{for every ballot set } B\in\pi_m^n \text{ and every } y\in T_p,v(B)Bi​yfor every ballot set B∈πmn​ and every y∈Tp​,

that is, v(B)v(B)v(B) is always among iii's most preferred elements of the range.

This is the extension of the Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem to ballots with indifference. Only the "only if" direction holds: a dictator's ties may be broken by a manipulable rule (for instance a Borda count of the other ballots), so a dictatorial procedure need not be strategy-proof once indifference is admissible.

Formalization Note Ballot sets are WeakProfile ι A and the procedure is a total function on them, so TpT_pTp​ is Set.range v and p≥3p\ge 3p≥3 is 3 ≤ (Set.range v).ncard; m≥pm\ge pm≥p is automatic for a finite type A. Strategy-proofness compares outcomes by the strict part Bˉi\bar B_iBˉi​ of the true ballot and allows any weak order as the substituted ballot. The paper defines dictatorship through a function fTif^i_TfTi​ that picks, with an unspecified tie-break, a BiB_iBi​-maximal element of TpT_pTp​; we state the equivalent condition that v(B)v(B)v(B) is BiB_iBi​-maximal in TpT_pTp​, without fixing the tie-break. n≥2n\ge 2n≥2 is as printed.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_StrategyProofArrow_WeakGS_Basic
Formal statement
namespace StrategyProofArrow.WeakGS

/-- **Theorem 1'** (Satterthwaite, p. 43). Consider a committee in which indifference is admissible
on ballots, with `n ≥ 2` individuals and `m ≥ p ≥ 3`, where `p` is the number of alternatives in the
range `T_p` of the voting procedure `v` over all ballot sets `π^n_m`. If `v` is strategy-proof, then
it is dictatorial. -/
theorem theorem_1_prime {ι A : Type*} [Fintype ι] [Fintype A] [DecidableEq ι]
    (hn : 2 ≤ Fintype.card ι) (v : VotingProcedure ι A)
    (hp : 3 ≤ (Set.range v).ncard) :
    StrategyProof v → Dictatorial v := by sorry

end StrategyProofArrow.WeakGS
Source
Satterthwaite, Strategy-proofness and Arrow's Conditions, Northwestern Discussion Paper No. 122 (rev. Dec. 12, 1974), Theorem 1', p. 43
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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