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Finite-support setting of the DSIC duality framework

Definition
DSICCompComp_Supplement_FiniteSetting

by iris · Nov 16, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

lp-dualitymechanism-designp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1revenue-maximization

The duality framework of Appendix C considers nnn bidders and mmm items, where bidder iii draws her value vector vi=(vi1,…,vim)v_i = (v_{i1}, \dots, v_{im})vi​=(vi1​,…,vim​) from a distribution DiD_iDi​ with finite support supp(Di)=Si\mathrm{supp}(D_i) = S_isupp(Di​)=Si​ and probability mass function fif_ifi​, positive on SiS_iSi​ with ∑vi∈Sifi(vi)=1\sum_{v_i \in S_i} f_i(v_i) = 1∑vi​∈Si​​fi​(vi​)=1. Bidders are independent (not necessarily identical), so the value profile has law D=×iDiD = \times_i D_iD=×i​Di​ with support supp(D)=×iSi\mathrm{supp}(D) = \times_i S_isupp(D)=×i​Si​.

Formalization Note Bidders are Fin n and items Fin m. Each SiS_iSi​ is a finite set of real vectors and fif_ifi​ is an arbitrary positive PMF on it: the page's Di=×jDijD_i = \times_j D_{ij}Di​=×j​Dij​ (independent items within a bidder) and nonnegativity of values are not imposed, since nothing in the framework uses them.

Definition code
import Mathlib

namespace DSICCompComp

namespace Supplement

/-- The finite-support setting of the DSIC duality framework (Ryu–Weinberg–Xue, *The DSIC Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent Items*, STOC 2027
submission, manuscript of Nov. 3, 2026, sha256 bf61bfdb…,
Appendix C, pp.34–35 (pdf pp.35–36) and footnote 15): `n` bidders and `m` items; bidder `i`'s value
vector `v_i = (v_i1, …, v_im)` is drawn from a distribution `D_i` with finite support
`supp(D_i) = S i` and PMF `f_i = f i`, positive on `S i` and summing to `1`; bidders are
independent, so the value profile has law `D = ×_i D_i` (see `jointPMF`).

**Formalization Note** Bidders are `Fin n` and items `Fin m` (0-based). Values are real vectors and
`f_i` is an arbitrary positive PMF on the finite set `S i`; the page's `D_i = ×_j D_ij`
(independent items within a bidder) and nonnegative values are not imposed. -/
structure FiniteSetting (n m : ℕ) where
  /-- `supp(D_i)`, the finite set of bidder `i`'s possible value vectors. -/
  S : Fin n → Finset (Fin m → ℝ)
  /-- `f_i`, the PMF of `D_i` on `supp(D_i)`. -/
  f : (i : Fin n) → S i → ℝ
  f_pos : ∀ i v, 0 < f i v
  f_sum : ∀ i, ∑ v, f i v = 1

end Supplement

end DSICCompComp
Source
Ryu–Weinberg–Xue, The DSIC Competition Complexity of Additive Buyers over Independent Items, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript of Nov. 3, 2026, sha256 bf61bfdb…), Appendix C, pp.34–35 (pdf pp.35–36) and footnote 15

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