Theorem 1, p. 996 — for κ ∈ (0, π) and small ε the target rebate (w*, û(w*), T*) exists uniquely, coordinates the channel and gives r* = κ, m* = π − κ
ProvedChannelRebate.Quantity.theorem1_target_rebate_coordinationLet demand have a density that vanishes on and is positive on (Assumption A4), with finite mean, distribution and . Let and , let satisfy , and let be the integrated-channel profit. Write and, for a wholesale price , let be the retailer's profit under the wholesale price-only contract at the order with .
Fix . Then there is such that for every with there is exactly one triple of reals satisfying the contract specification
- ;
- ;
- and
and this triple satisfies
- (a) , , ;
- (b) channel coordination: is the retailer's unique optimal order under , ;
- (c) the retailer earns and the manufacturer earns .
The theorem shows that a target rebate, with no side payment, coordinates the newsvendor channel and splits its profit in any proportion.
Formalization Note "For sufficiently small" is the existence of the threshold . Uniqueness ranges over all real triples satisfying 1–3, with unrestricted; that is part of the conclusion. Coordination is stated as equality of the set of maximizers over with , i.e. global optimality, not a first-order condition.
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_CachonCoord_Newsvendor_Contracts import Definitions.Def_ChannelRebate_Quantity_Setting open MeasureTheory
namespace ChannelRebate.Quantity
/-- Taylor (2002), Theorem 1 and display (1), p. 996. For `κ ∈ (0, π)`, `π = (p − s)Γ(Q̄₀)`,
and every sufficiently small `ε ∈ (0, κ)`, there is exactly one triple `(w*, u*, T*)` with
(1) `r̲(w*) = κ − ε`, (2) `u* = û(w*)`, (3) `T* ≥ 0` solving (1); and it satisfies
(a) `w* ∈ (c, p)`, `u* > 0`, `T* > 0`; (b) the retailer's unique optimal order is `Q̄₀`
(channel coordination); (c) `r* = κ` and `m* = π − κ`. -/
theorem theorem1_target_rebate_coordination (p c s : ℝ) (hc : 0 < c) (hcp : c < p)
(hsc : s < c) (D : Demand)
(Qbar0 : ℝ) (hQbar0 : 0 < Qbar0) (hΦbar : Phi D Qbar0 = (p - c) / (p - s))
(κ : ℝ) (hκ0 : 0 < κ) (hκπ : κ < (p - s) * Gam D Qbar0) :
∃ ε0 : ℝ, 0 < ε0 ∧ ∀ ε : ℝ, 0 < ε → ε < ε0 → ε < κ →
∃! x : ℝ × ℝ × ℝ,
-- the contract specification (1)–(3), with x = (w, u, T)
((∃ Q0 : ℝ, 0 ≤ Q0 ∧ Phi D Q0 = (p - x.1) / (p - s) ∧
wholesaleProfit p s x.1 D Q0 = κ - ε) ∧
x.2.1 = uHat p c s x.1 ∧
0 ≤ x.2.2 ∧
(p + x.2.1 - s) * Gam D Qbar0
- x.2.1 * (Gam D x.2.2 + x.2.2 * (1 - Phi D x.2.2)) = κ) ∧
-- (a)
(c < x.1 ∧ x.1 < p ∧ 0 < x.2.1 ∧ 0 < x.2.2) ∧
-- (b) channel coordination
optimalOrders (retailerProfit p s x.1 x.2.1 x.2.2 D) = {Qbar0} ∧
-- (c)
retailerProfit p s x.1 x.2.1 x.2.2 D Qbar0 = κ ∧
manufProfit c x.1 x.2.1 x.2.2 D Qbar0 = (p - s) * Gam D Qbar0 - κ := by sorry
end ChannelRebate.Quantity
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.