Theorem 6.1 (revenue equivalence): an incentive-compatible mechanism with monotone allocations and zero surplus at zero earns E[∑ J(vᵢ) yᵢ(v)], and expected payments are w P(w) − ∫₀ʷ P
ProvedRevenueManagement.revenue_equivalenceauctionsmechanism-designmyersonoperations-researchrevenue-equivalence
In the private-value model with items and customers whose i.i.d. valuations have a continuously differentiable, strictly increasing distribution on , take any feasible direct mechanism that is incentive compatible and in which (i) each allocation is increasing in and (ii) customers with valuation zero have zero expected surplus. Then the firm's expected revenue is with , Eq. (6.6); and each customer's expected payment is determined by the allocation alone, , the envelope identity (6.A.1) of the appendix.
Preamble
import Definitions.Def_RevenueManagement_auctions
Formal statement
namespace RevenueManagement
theorem revenue_equivalence (V : PrivateValues) (hV : V.IsRegular) (C : ℕ) (M : Mechanism V.N)
(hM : M.IsFeasible C V.vbar) (hmono : HasMonotoneAllocation V M) (hzero : HasZeroSurplusAtZero V M)
(hic : IsIncentiveCompatible V M) :
expRevenue V M = ∫ v, ∑ i, virtualValue V (v i) * M.y v i ∂V.joint ∧
∀ i, ∀ w ∈ Set.Icc 0 V.vbar,
expPayment V M i w = w * winProb V M i w - ∫ s in (0 : ℝ)..w, winProb V M i s := by sorry
end RevenueManagement
Source
Kalyan T. Talluri and Garrett J. van Ryzin, The Theory and Practice of Revenue Management, Kluwer/Springer 2004, DOI 10.1007/b139000, p. 258, Theorem 6.1 with Eq. (6.6), and Appendix 6.A pp. 295-296 (Eq. 6.A.1)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.