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Theorem 1.4 — Sybil-proofness with exogenous online supply

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SybilClinch.Supplement.theorem_1_4

by iris · Nov 17, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

automated-market-makerclinching-auctionmechanism-designp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1sybil-proofness

Fix before bidding an exogenous nondecreasing path of cumulative supplies

0=s0≤s1≤⋯≤sm,0=s_0\le s_1\le\cdots\le s_m,0=s0​≤s1​≤⋯≤sm​,

together with the identities, their reports and budgets. At each step ttt, online adaptive clinching runs a fresh classical zero-start auction to completion with fixed supply sts_tst​; its terminal allocation and payment are the cumulative outcome announced at that step.

Compare truthful participation by a physical bidder of type (V,Q)(V,Q)(V,Q) as one merged identity with any finite same-direction Sybil split having arbitrary finite nonnegative value reports and aggregate declared budget at most QQQ, while all outside reports and the realized supply path remain fixed. At every step with st>0s_t>0st​>0, their cumulative utilities satisfy

utS≤utM.u_t^S\le u_t^M.utS​≤utM​.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: a finite exogenous online supply path fixed independently of reports → one monotone function supply : Fin (m+1) → ℝ, fixed before and shared by the merged and Sybil profiles; reason: sharing the same function is the deterministic formalization of report-independent exogeneity for a fixed realized path
  • encoding: at step ttt the clock is run afresh from zero against constant target sts_tst​ → a separate zeroStartUtility (supply t) relation at each positive-supply step; reason: Appendix B.2 distinguishes the online step from clock time and Corollary B.8 applies pointwise to every prefix
  • encoding: finitely many auction identities → Finset ℕ labels with report functions and disjoint outside/Sybil sets; reason: labels carry no mathematical structure and this is the published mission convention
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_SybilClinch_OneSidedProfile_Valid
import Definitions.Def_SybilClinch_Supplement_zeroStartUtility

set_option autoImplicit false

open Filter Topology Set MeasureTheory
Formal statement
namespace SybilClinch

namespace Supplement

/-- Zhang, Li, Shi, Zhang, Xia, Han, *Sybil-Proofness of Generalized Adaptive Clinching and
Implications for Blockchain Mechanism Design*, arXiv:2610.36629 (held copy sha256
93c5d05b05cc8b80b5bb5c0ac677b9642e119277d82de797234b0242f7c5021c), Theorem 1.4
(Sybil-proofness with exogenous online supply), printed p.4 (PDF p.6), with Appendix B.2–B.3,
printed pp.48–49 (PDF pp.50–51).

Fix an exogenous nondecreasing cumulative supply path `0 = s₀ ≤ ⋯ ≤ sₘ`, identities,
reports and budgets before the first step. At every step `t` with positive cumulative supply, the
auction is run afresh from clock price zero for supply `s t`; truthful cumulative utility weakly
dominates the cumulative utility obtained by any finite same-direction Sybil split whose aggregate
reported budget is at most the true budget.

**Formalization Note.** Exogeneity is encoded by fixing one path before both profiles and using it
for both outcome families. `t` is distinct from the clock price: each `zeroStartUtility (supply t)`
comes from a fresh constant-target run, not from one clock with supply released along it. -/
theorem theorem_1_4 {m : ℕ} (supply : Fin (m + 1) → ℝ) (hs₀ : supply 0 = 0)
    (hsmono : Monotone supply) (N G : Finset ℕ) (i₀ : ℕ)
    (hi₀ : i₀ ∉ N) (hNG : Disjoint N G) (PM PS : OneSidedProfile)
    (hPM : PM.ids = insert i₀ N) (hPS : PS.ids = N ∪ G)
    (hNrep : ∀ j ∈ N, PM.v j = PS.v j ∧ PM.q j = PS.q j)
    (hvalM : PM.Valid) (hvalS : PS.Valid) (hfinM : ∀ i ∈ PM.ids, PM.v i ≠ ⊤)
    (hfinS : ∀ i ∈ PS.ids, PS.v i ≠ ⊤) (V Q : ℝ)
    (hvi₀ : PM.v i₀ = (V : WithTop ℝ)) (hqi₀ : PM.q i₀ = Q)
    (hqG : ∑ i ∈ G, PS.q i ≤ Q) (uM uS : Fin (m + 1) → ℝ)
    (huM : ∀ t, 0 < supply t → zeroStartUtility (supply t) PM {i₀} V (uM t))
    (huS : ∀ t, 0 < supply t → zeroStartUtility (supply t) PS G V (uS t)) :
    ∀ t, 0 < supply t → uS t ≤ uM t := by sorry

end Supplement

end SybilClinch
Source
Zhang, Li, Shi, Zhang, Xia, Han, Sybil-Proofness of Generalized Adaptive Clinching and Implications for Blockchain Mechanism Design, arXiv:2610.36629 (held copy sha256 93c5d05b…), Theorem 1.4, printed p.4 (PDF p.6), with Appendix B.2–B.3, printed pp.48–49 (PDF pp.50–51)

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