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§4 p. 312 and §6 'First' pp. 314–315 — an optimal monopoly assignment is below the competitive one except at the top

Proved
MussaRosen.Mono.monopoly_quality_below_competitive

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

monopolyno-distortion-at-the-topp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1quality-distortionscreening

Setting. Consumer types θ\thetaθ are distributed on [θ‾,θˉ][\underline\theta,\bar\theta][θ​,θˉ] (0≤θ‾<θˉ0\le\underline\theta<\bar\theta0≤θ​<θˉ) with a density fff that is positive and differentiable on the whole interval; F(θ)=∫θ‾θfF(\theta)=\int_{\underline\theta}^\theta fF(θ)=∫θ​θ​f and MR(θ)=θ−(1−F(θ))/f(θ)MR(\theta)=\theta-(1-F(\theta))/f(\theta)MR(θ)=θ−(1−F(θ))/f(θ). The unit cost CCC of quality satisfies C(0)=0C(0)=0C(0)=0, is twice differentiable, and C′(q)>0C'(q)>0C′(q)>0, C′′(q)>0C''(q)>0C′′(q)>0 for all q≥0q\ge0q≥0. Under competition type θ\thetaθ buys the quality J(θ)J(\theta)J(θ) with C′(J(θ))=θC'(J(\theta))=\thetaC′(J(θ))=θ when θ>C′(0)\theta>C'(0)θ>C′(0), and does not buy when θ≤C′(0)\theta\le C'(0)θ≤C′(0). Let qqq be an optimal monopoly assignment: nondecreasing, nonnegative and piecewise differentiable on [θ‾,θˉ][\underline\theta,\bar\theta][θ​,θˉ], maximizing

Π(q)=∫θ‾θˉ[θ q(θ)−∫θ‾θq(s) ds−C(q(θ))]f(θ) dθ\Pi(q)=\int_{\underline\theta}^{\bar\theta}\Bigl[\theta\,q(\theta)-\int_{\underline\theta}^{\theta}q(s)\,ds-C(q(\theta))\Bigr]f(\theta)\,d\thetaΠ(q)=∫θ​θˉ​[θq(θ)−∫θ​θ​q(s)ds−C(q(θ))]f(θ)dθ

among all such assignments.

Claim. Then

  1. every type served under competition, other than the top type, gets a strictly lower quality from the monopolist:
C′(q(θ))<θfor all θ‾≤θ<θˉ with θ>C′(0),C'(q(\theta))<\theta\quad\text{for all }\underline\theta\le\theta<\bar\theta\text{ with }\theta>C'(0),C′(q(θ))<θfor all θ​≤θ<θˉ with θ>C′(0),

that is, qm(θ)<qc(θ)=J(θ)q^m(\theta)<q^c(\theta)=J(\theta)qm(θ)<qc(θ)=J(θ) wherever J(θ)>0J(\theta)>0J(θ)>0; 2. types not served under competition are not served by the monopolist: q(θ)=0q(\theta)=0q(θ)=0 for θ‾≤θ<θˉ\underline\theta\le\theta<\bar\thetaθ​≤θ<θˉ with θ≤C′(0)\theta\le C'(0)θ≤C′(0); 3. the top type gets the competitive quality: if C′(0)<θˉC'(0)<\bar\thetaC′(0)<θˉ, then q(θ)q(\theta)q(θ) converges, as θ↑θˉ\theta\uparrow\bar\thetaθ↑θˉ, to a limit LLL with C′(L)=θˉC'(L)=\bar\thetaC′(L)=θˉ, i.e. qm(θˉ)=J(θˉ)q^m(\bar\theta)=J(\bar\theta)qm(θˉ)=J(θˉ); if θˉ≤C′(0)\bar\theta\le C'(0)θˉ≤C′(0), then q(θ)→0q(\theta)\to0q(θ)→0.

This is the paper's main conclusion: the monopolist lowers the quality sold to every consumer who buys under competition, except the consumer with the highest valuation of quality ("no distortion at the top").

Formalization Note The competitive assignment J=C′−1J=C'^{-1}J=C′−1 is never formed: "q(θ)<J(θ)q(\theta)<J(\theta)q(θ)<J(θ)" is written as C′(q(θ))<θC'(q(\theta))<\thetaC′(q(θ))<θ, which is equivalent because C′C'C′ is strictly increasing on q≥0q\ge0q≥0. The value at the top is stated as a left limit, because the profit integral does not depend on the single value q(θˉ)q(\bar\theta)q(θˉ), which an optimal assignment may raise freely. The paper writes "MR(θˉ)=θˉ=J(θˉ)MR(\bar\theta)=\bar\theta=J(\bar\theta)MR(θˉ)=θˉ=J(θˉ)" on p. 312; the intended reading is MR(θˉ)=θˉMR(\bar\theta)=\bar\thetaMR(θˉ)=θˉ, hence G(θˉ)=J(θˉ)G(\bar\theta)=J(\bar\theta)G(θˉ)=J(θˉ). C(0)=0C(0)=0C(0)=0 encodes that quality 000 means not buying, so that no cost is charged for unserved types.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MussaRosen_Mono_Setting

open MechanismDesign.Screening Filter Topology
Formal statement
namespace MussaRosen.Mono

theorem monopoly_quality_below_competitive {θlo θhi : ℝ} (D : TypeDistribution θlo θhi)
    (hfd : DifferentiableOn ℝ D.f (Set.Icc θlo θhi))
    (C : ℝ → ℝ) (hC0 : C 0 = 0) (hCd : Differentiable ℝ C) (hCd2 : Differentiable ℝ (deriv C))
    (hC1 : ∀ q : ℝ, 0 ≤ q → 0 < deriv C q) (hC2 : ∀ q : ℝ, 0 ≤ q → 0 < deriv (deriv C) q)
    (q : ℝ → ℝ) (hq : IsOptimal D C q) :
    (∀ θ ∈ Set.Ico θlo θhi, deriv C 0 < θ → deriv C (q θ) < θ) ∧
    (∀ θ ∈ Set.Ico θlo θhi, θ ≤ deriv C 0 → q θ = 0) ∧
    ((deriv C 0 < θhi → ∃ L : ℝ, Tendsto q (𝓝[<] θhi) (𝓝 L) ∧ deriv C L = θhi) ∧
      (θhi ≤ deriv C 0 → Tendsto q (𝓝[<] θhi) (𝓝 0))) := by sorry

end MussaRosen.Mono
Source
Mussa and Rosen, Monopoly and product quality, J. Econ. Theory 18 (1978), p. 312 (§4, paragraph 'These conditions imply …') and pp. 314–315 (§6, 'First')
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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