§4.2 — the retailer's ex ante profits
ProvedInfoSharing.Diseconomy.ex_ante_profits_retailerinformation-sharingp2o-batch-p200bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1supply-chain
Under the hypotheses of the manufacturers' §4.2 identities, the retailer's ex ante profits in any pricing-equilibrium family are
with the closed forms of §4.2.
Together with the manufacturers' identities they are the whole input of the contracting analysis.
Formalization Note. The pricing stage is the Bayesian game of §4.1 on the signal model; the ex ante profits , are those of an arbitrary pricing-equilibrium family, not the §4.2 closed forms. Wholesale strategies are measurable, square-integrable functions of the signal value (constants for an uninformed manufacturer); the production cost is with and ; manufacturers are indexed by .
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_InfoSharing_Shared_IsSignalModel import Definitions.Def_InfoSharing_Shared_PayoffTable import Definitions.Def_InfoSharing_Shared_ClosedForms open MeasureTheory open InfoSharing.Shared
Formal statement
namespace InfoSharing.Diseconomy
/-- §4.2, p. 252 (with `c = c_d > 0`): in every pricing-equilibrium family the retailer's ex
ante profits are `π_R(0)`, `π_R(1)` and `π_R(2)`. -/
theorem ex_ante_profits_retailer {Ω : Type*} [MeasurableSpace Ω] (μ : Measure Ω)
(θ Y : Ω → ℝ) (a b c φ σ β : ℝ) (hmodel : IsSignalModel μ θ Y σ β) (hφ : 0 < φ)
(hb : 0 < b) (hc : 0 < c) (E : (Fin 2 → Status) → PricingProfile)
(hE : IsPricingEqFamily μ θ Y a b c φ β E) :
let P := payoffTable μ θ Y a b c φ E
P.R (fun _ => Status.uninformed) = piR0 a b c φ σ β ∧
(∀ i : Fin 2, P.R (onlyInformed i) = piR1 a b c φ σ β) ∧
P.R (fun _ => Status.informed) = piR2 a b c φ σ β := by sorry
end InfoSharing.Diseconomy
Source
Shang, Ha & Tong, Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with a Common Retailer, Management Sci. 62(1) 2016, p. 252, §4.2
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.