Positive scaling of triangular min-buying revenues
ProvedMinBuying.triangular_revenue_homogeneitymin-buyingpricingprobability
Let be a finite independent triangular-valuation instance with parameters and caps . Assume its differentiated and uniform revenue optima are finite and attained, with positive uniform optimum. For every scale , there is an instance with the same number of items and parameters and such that the same optimization conditions hold and
This formalizes the positive rescaling used to normalize uniform revenue to one in the proof of Theorem 4. It preserves the pricing ratio and does not add moment assumptions.
Preamble
import Definitions.Def_MinBuying_Triangular
Formal statement
namespace MinBuying
/-- Positive scaling of triangular valuation parameters scales both pricing
optima by the same factor. This is the normalization used on pp.22--23. -/
theorem triangular_revenue_homogeneity (n : ℕ) (I : TriangularInstance n)
(hI : WellPosed (triangularJoint I)) (s : ℝ) (hs : 0 < s) :
∃ J : TriangularInstance n,
(∀ i, J.a i = s * I.a i) ∧
(∀ i, J.cap i = s * I.cap i) ∧
WellPosed (triangularJoint J) ∧
DPRevenue (triangularJoint J) = s * DPRevenue (triangularJoint I) ∧
UPRevenue (triangularJoint J) = s * UPRevenue (triangularJoint I) := by
sorry
end MinBuying
Source
Cui, Hamilton, Lamperski, and Ganjizadeh Tari, Unit-Demand Pricing for Min-Buying Customers, September 27, 2026 manuscript, https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.5178133, p.23, proof of Theorem 4 (rescaling step); Eq.(11) for the triangular laws. Supporting normalization lemma.