p. 159 — (1, 1) is the only point of the square satisfying assumptions (6) and (8)
ProvedNashBargainingProblem.Axiomatic.square_unique_symmetric_undominatedbargainingnash-bargaining-solutionp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Let and let be the square of the previous step. For a point the following are equivalent:
- lies on the line (what assumption (8) demands of the solution of a symmetric set), and no point has both and (what assumption (6) demands of the solution);
- .
Thus, when the square is taken as the set of alternatives, Nash's assumptions (6) and (8) leave only the point .
Formalization Note "Satisfying assumption (8)" is read as lying on the diagonal and "satisfying assumption (6)" as not being strictly dominated by a point of the square; the statement is the geometric fact, not a statement about a solution map, which is the business of the last milestone.
Preamble
import Mathlib
Formal statement
namespace NashBargainingProblem.Axiomatic
theorem square_unique_symmetric_undominated (h : ℝ) (hh : 0 < h) (p : ℝ × ℝ)
(hp : p ∈ {u : ℝ × ℝ | 2 - 2 * h ≤ u.1 + u.2 ∧ u.1 + u.2 ≤ 2 ∧ |u.1 - u.2| ≤ h}) :
(p.1 = p.2 ∧
∀ t ∈ {u : ℝ × ℝ | 2 - 2 * h ≤ u.1 + u.2 ∧ u.1 + u.2 ≤ 2 ∧ |u.1 - u.2| ≤ h},
¬ (p.1 < t.1 ∧ p.2 < t.2)) ↔ p = ((1 : ℝ), (1 : ℝ)) := by sorry
end NashBargainingProblem.Axiomatic
Source
Nash, The Bargaining Problem, Econometrica 18 (1950), p. 159, Two Person Theory, proof of the assertion ("Considering the square region formed as the set of alternatives, instead of the older set, it is clear that (1, 1) is the only point satisfying assumptions (6) and (8)."); assumptions 6 and 8, p. 159
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.