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Lemma 2 — the deletion loss of an item is at most the single-item ex-ante-constrained optimum

Proved
ConsumerUtilityApprox.UnitDemand.lemma_2

by Shuze Chen · Nov 10, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

consumer-utilitymechanism-designp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1probability

Let VVV be a buyer's type with independent coordinates Vj∼GjV_j\sim G_jVj​∼Gj​ on [0,∞)[0,\infty)[0,∞), 0<E[Vj]<∞0<\mathbb E[V_j]<\infty0<E[Vj​]<∞. Let (x,p)(x,p)(x,p) be a truthful, individually rational single-buyer mechanism with nonnegative payments and allocations in [0,1]m[0,1]^m[0,1]m, utility uuu, and let qj≥E[xj(V)]q_j\ge\mathbb E[x_j(V)]qj​≥E[xj​(V)]. Then for every item jjj

Dj=EV[u(V)−u(V−j,0)]≤OPT1,1(Vj;qj),D_j=\mathbb E_V\big[u(V)-u(V_{-j},0)\big]\le\mathrm{OPT}^{1,1}(V_j;q_j),Dj​=EV​[u(V)−u(V−j​,0)]≤OPT1,1(Vj​;qj​),

where OPT1,1\mathrm{OPT}^{1,1}OPT1,1 is the supremum of E[Vja(Vj)−τ(Vj)]\mathbb E[V_ja(V_j)-\tau(V_j)]E[Vj​a(Vj​)−τ(Vj​)] over BIC, IR single-dimensional mechanisms with nonnegative payments and E[a(Vj)]≤qj\mathbb E[a(V_j)]\le q_jE[a(Vj​)]≤qj​. It reduces the variation term to single-item problems.

Differences from the source:

  • reading: a single-buyer mechanism of §3 (unit-demand or constrained-additive; p. 13: the bounds need no unit demand) → any mechanism with x(b) ∈ [0,1]^m, no unit-demand clause; reason: §3 states these bounds for every feasible outcome set F ⊆ [0,1]^m (Theorem 1's setting); unit demand is a special case
  • reading: expectations E[x_j(V)], E[u(V)] of a single-buyer mechanism (rules tacitly measurable) → IsTruthfulIRNPT includes Borel measurability of x and p; reason: the standing convention without which the source's expectations are undefined
  • encoding: values in R_+, laws F_j, items 1..m → ℝ≥0, ProbabilityMeasure ℝ≥0, Fin m; product law vecLaw; reason: Lean conventions for the same objects
  • encoding: OPT^{1,1} defined as a max (2.3) → OPT11 is the supremum (sSup); attainment is the separate item posted_price_representation; reason: an upper bound by the supremum is the same as by the maximum once the maximum exists
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MultiItemRev_BundlingOpt_Model
import Definitions.Def_ConsumerUtilityApprox_UnitDemand_Model
open MeasureTheory ProbabilityTheory
open scoped NNReal ENNReal
open MultiItemRev.BundlingOpt
Formal statement
namespace ConsumerUtilityApprox.UnitDemand

theorem lemma_2 {m : ℕ} (hm : 1 ≤ m) (G : Fin m → ProbabilityMeasure ℝ≥0)
    (hG : ∀ j, IsValueLaw (G j)) (M : Mechanism (Fin m)) (hM : IsTruthfulIRNPT M)
    (q : Fin m → ℝ) (hq : ∀ j, qAlloc (vecLaw G) M j ≤ q j) (j : Fin m) :
    deletionLoss (vecLaw G) M j ≤ OPT11 (G j) (q j) := by sorry

end ConsumerUtilityApprox.UnitDemand
Source
Goldner, Lundy, Tsilivis, A Constant-Factor Approximation to Multidimensional Consumer Utility, arXiv:2610.10516 (version of November 3, 2026, sha256 94e0dd44…), p. 12, Lemma 2
Human review
  • Endorsed by Community (Bot) · Nov 10, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Nov 10, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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