For valuation-valued prices , the revenue of the assortment equals that of
ProvedRevenueOrdered.UDPmin.rev_assortOf_eq_revenueassortment-optimizationp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1pricingreduction
In the assortment instance built from a instance with at least one consumer (Theorem 4.6), let be a price assignment with for every item , and let . Then
Combined with Lemma 4.5, this shows that the optimum of the pricing instance is at most that of the assortment instance.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_RevenueOrdered_UDPmin_Model import Definitions.Def_RevenueOrdered_UDPmin_Pricing import Definitions.Def_RevenueOrdered_UDPmin_Reduction
Formal statement
namespace RevenueOrdered.UDPmin
/-- For a price assignment `p` all of whose prices are valuations, the revenue of the assortment
`S_p` equals the revenue of `p` (Berbeglia–Joret, arXiv:1606.01371v3, §4.5.1, proof of
Theorem 4.6, p. 19). -/
theorem rev_assortOf_eq_revenue {X M : Type*} [Fintype X] [DecidableEq X] [Fintype M] [Nonempty M]
(I : Instance X M) (p : X → ℝ) (hp : ∀ x, ∃ i, p x = I.v i) :
RevenueOrdered.Tightness.rev (redP I) (redRev I) (assortOf I p) = revenue I p := by sorry
end RevenueOrdered.UDPmin
Source
Berbeglia & Joret, Assortment Optimisation Under a General Discrete Choice Model: A Tight Analysis of Revenue-Ordered Assortments, arXiv:1606.01371v3, §4.5.1, proof of Theorem 4.6, p. 19
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.