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Corollary 1 — atomless asymptotically exact equilibria: lim inf⁡kW/O=1\liminf_k W/O=1liminfk​W/O=1

Proved
LargeSupplyFPA.Asymptotic.corollary_1

by Shuze Chen · Nov 10, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bayes-nash-equilibriumfirst-price-auctionmulti-unit-auctionp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1price-of-anarchy

Let H>0H>0H>0 and κ>0\kappa>0κ>0. Consider a sequence of kkk-unit first-price auctions with n(k)>kn(k)>kn(k)>k agents satisfying Assumption 1, and a sequence of ϵ(k)\epsilon^{(k)}ϵ(k)-approximate Bayes–Nash equilibria E(k)E^{(k)}E(k) satisfying Assumption 3 and Assumption 4 with ϵ(k)→0\epsilon^{(k)}\to0ϵ(k)→0. Then

lim inf⁡k→∞W(E(k),A(k))O(A(k))=1.\liminf_{k\to\infty}\frac{W(E^{(k)},A^{(k)})}{O(A^{(k)})}=1.k→∞liminf​O(A(k))W(E(k),A(k))​=1.

This is part (a) of the main theorem for atomless equilibria that may over-bid by a vanishing amount. Theorem 3 reduces the general case to it.

Formalization Note The ratio lies in [0,1][0,1][0,1], so Filter.liminf on ℝ is the genuine limit inferior.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: a strategy is a map E_i : V_i → Δ(ℝ≥0) from values to bid distributions → a Markov kernel E i : Kernel ℝ ℝ with E i v ((−∞, 0)) = 0 for every v; reason: measurability in v is what makes the marginal bid distribution ∫ E_{i,v} dV_i defined; a law on ℝ with no mass below 0 is a law on ℝ≥0
  • encoding: a sequence of k-unit auctions (A^(k))_{k∈ℕ} with n(k) > k agents; subsequences (A^(k_l)) → n : ℕ → ℕ with k < n k, agents Fin (n k), value laws V k and kernels E k indexed by the unit count k (k = 0 included); a subsequence is a strictly increasing φ : ℕ → ℕ and the auction φ l has φ l units; reason: Lean indexing; the term k = 0 does not affect any limit
  • reading: Assumption 1(a): every value is at most H almost surely (values are non-negative in the model; 1(b) is stated on [0, H]) → V_i([0, H]) = 1 together with the density bound of 1(b), and 0 < H, 0 < κ; reason: the paper's values are non-negative (its bound O(A^(k)) ≥ kζ and W ≥ 0 use it, and p. 6 fixes H > 0, κ > 0); under Assumption 3 alone non-negativity is not implied, so it is read into Assumption 1
  • reading: E_{b∼E_{i,v}}[u_i(v, b)] ≥ sup_{b≥0} u_i(v, b) − ϵ for every v ∈ supp(V_i) → for every v ∈ supp(V_i): b ↦ u_i(v, b) is E_{i,v}-integrable and u_i(v, b) − ϵ ≤ ∫ u_i(v, ·) dE_{i,v} for every b ≥ 0; reason: the ∀ b form is equivalent to the sup form; integrability makes explicit that the paper's expectation is finite (it holds automatically when bids are bounded on the support, as under Assumptions 2 and 3)
  • encoding: Let ϵ := lim_{k→∞} ϵ^(k) and suppose ϵ = 0 → Tendsto εs atTop (𝓝 0); reason: same hypothesis
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_LargeSupplyFPA_Asymptotic_Model
import Definitions.Def_LargeSupplyFPA_Asymptotic_Assumptions

open MeasureTheory ProbabilityTheory Filter Topology
Formal statement
namespace LargeSupplyFPA.Asymptotic

theorem corollary_1 (H κ : ℝ) (hH : 0 < H) (hκ : 0 < κ)
    (n : ℕ → ℕ) (V : ∀ k, Fin (n k) → Measure ℝ) (E : ∀ k, Fin (n k) → Kernel ℝ ℝ)
    (εs : ℕ → ℝ)
    (hseq : IsAuctionSequence n V E) (hA1 : ∀ k, Assumption1 H κ (V k))
    (hBNE : ∀ k, IsApproxBNE k (V k) (E k) (εs k))
    (hA3 : Assumption3 n V E) (hA4 : ∀ k, IsAtomless (V k) (E k))
    (hε : Tendsto εs atTop (𝓝 0)) :
    Filter.liminf (fun k => welfareRatio k (V k) (E k)) atTop = 1 := by sorry

end LargeSupplyFPA.Asymptotic
Source
Hartline, Shah, vonAllmen, Robust Analysis of First-Price Auctions with Large Supply, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript of November 3, 2026, sha256 2ad8363b…), p. 23, Corollary 1
Human review
  • Endorsed by Community (Bot) · Nov 10, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Nov 10, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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