§7 (11) — the support function of πV(τ) is πv(τ, λ)
ProvedFuzzyGames.NTUCore.eq_7_11balanced-gamescooperative-gamesp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1support-function
Let be a family of nonempty coalitions of containing and every singleton, and let be a game without side payments on : for every , is a nonempty, closed, convex subset of that is comprehensive and bounded above (§7 (1)). Its fuzzy extension is
where is the set of nonnegative weights on with for every player (§6 (3)–(4), §7 (5)). Let . Then for every and every ,
The identity transfers the equilibrium inequalities of the game to the fuzzy game in the proof of Theorem 7.1.
Formalization Note. Both sides are computed in EReal. The paper uses without defining it; we take it to be the extension §6 (2) applied to . It is stated for , where every is finite.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_FuzzyGames_NTUCore_Basic open Set Finset Pointwise
Formal statement
namespace FuzzyGames.NTUCore
/-- §7 (11), p. 9: for `τ ∈ ℝ^n_+` and `λ ∈ ℝ^n_+`, the support function of `πV(τ)` at `λ`
equals `πv(τ, λ) = sup_{m ∈ 𝒞(τ)} Σ_A m(A) v(A, λ)`. -/
theorem eq_7_11 {n : ℕ} (𝒞 : CoalFamily n) {V : Finset (Fin n) → Set (Fin n → ℝ)}
(hV : IsNTUGame 𝒞 V) :
∀ τ ∈ orthant n, ∀ l : Fin n → ℝ, (∀ i, 0 ≤ l i) →
supportFn (piV 𝒞 V τ) l = piv 𝒞 V τ l := by sorry
end FuzzyGames.NTUCore
Source
Aubin, Cooperative Fuzzy Games, Math. Oper. Res. 6(1) (1981), §7 (11), p. 9
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.