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Theorem 11 — the adaptive Naor–Yung scheme Πq∉Secad(r)\Pi_q\notin\mathrm{Sec}^{ad}(r)Πq​∈/Secad(r); success ≥1−δR−2δL−negl\ge1-\delta_R-2\delta_L-\mathrm{negl}≥1−δR​−2δL​−negl given the sampler succeeds

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RestrictedDec.Supplement.theorem_11

by iris · Nov 16, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

chosen-ciphertext-securityfunctional-decryptionp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1public-key-encryptionsecurity-hierarchy

Let MMM be a common message space, qqq an observation with the two public conditions of §2.3 and label length ℓ(λ)\ell(\lambda)ℓ(λ), and rrr any uniformly efficient map on decryption outputs. Let RRR be an efficient, ordinarily correct residual scheme over MMM; LLL an efficient label scheme over {0,1}ℓ(λ)\{0,1\}^{\ell(\lambda)}{0,1}ℓ(λ) with (KC); NNN an efficient, perfectly complete NIZK for (B.4); and SSS an efficient, correct, strongly unforgeable one-time signature. Suppose a uniform PPT sampler, run independently of the generated keys, finds valid distinct equal-length m0,m1m_0,m_1m0​,m1​ with

q(m0)=q(m1),r(m0)≠r(m1)q(m_0)=q(m_1),\qquad r(m_0)\neq r(m_1)q(m0​)=q(m1​),r(m0​)=r(m1​)

with non-negligible probability on infinitely many security parameters. Then

  1. the signed scheme Πq\Pi_qΠq​ is not in Secad(r)\mathrm{Sec}^{ad}(r)Secad(r);
  2. there are a uniform PPT attacker AAA and a negligible ν\nuν such that, for every nonnegative function δR\delta_RδR​ bounding the honest decryption error of RRR (Definition 3), every λ\lambdaλ and every coin vector ρ\rhoρ on which the sampler succeeds, the attacker run with ρ\rhoρ as its sampler coins guesses the challenge bit of the adaptive Fr\mathcal F_rFr​ experiment correctly with probability at least
1−δR(λ)−2δL(λ)−ν(λ).1-\delta_R(\lambda)-2\delta_L(\lambda)-\nu(\lambda).1−δR​(λ)−2δL​(λ)−ν(λ).

The proof constrains only the labels, so a fresh, independently signed ciphertext can reuse the challenge's residual component; a finer oracle then reveals the residual message.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: keys, messages, ciphertexts, labels, M_⊥, coins, PPT adversaries and reductions → bit strings with tuple codes, Option Str (none = ⊥), explicit uniform coin vectors, uniform reactive machines with a polynomial-time step function (RestrictedDec.Adversary); reason: the model of the published base mission; same instances
  • encoding: Sec^t(q) = Sec^t(F_q), F_q = {g ∘ q : g an admissible circuit / efficient public postprocessing} → SecM t M (famObs q); reason: the published famObs is the class of §2.3, p.14
  • encoding: PPT primitives (R, L, I, P, S, N, q, samplers) → separate efficiency hypotheses (IsSchemeM, IsEfficient, IsPublic, IsObsMap); reason: the paper's PPT convention; the reductions run these algorithms
  • generalization: conditional on the sampler succeeding, the attacker guesses correctly with probability at least 1 − δ_R − 2δ_L − negl(λ) → the bound for each successful coin vector ρ of the sampler, the attacker started with ρ as its state, with one negligible ν uniform in ρ, λ and δ_R; reason: averaging the pointwise bound over the successful ρ gives the conditional probability
  • generalization: the standing assumptions of App. B.1 on the construction (CPA security of R and L, the NIZK's soundness, zero knowledge and simulation soundness, efficient recognition of plaintexts) → only the properties the attack uses: correctness of R, (KC) of L, NIZK completeness, signature correctness and strong unforgeability, and efficiency; reason: fewer hypotheses; the paper's setting satisfies them
  • reading: δ_R (R's honest error) and δ_L in the bound → every nonnegative δ_R with ErrBound M R δ_R (Definition 3), and δ_L = kcFail L ℓ, the exact (KC) failure probability; reason: App. B.1, p.35 ('negligible fixed-message error bound δR'; (KC)); an error bound is a probability bound, and a negative δ_R (possible only where R never errs) would push the lower bound above 1
  • encoding: a uniform PPT sampler finding the pair with nonnegligible probability on infinitely many security parameters → a uniform PPT Sampler whose success probability is not negligible; reason: a function is non-negligible iff it exceeds some inverse polynomial infinitely often
  • encoding: the common message space → hypothesis MsgSpace.Found M; reason: standing assumption of §2.1, p.13
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_famObs
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_Supplement_MsgSpace
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_Supplement_IsSchemeM
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_Supplement_SecM
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_Supplement_INDCPAM
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_Supplement_kcFail
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_Supplement_Sampler
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_Supplement_nyAd
open QAlgorithms.Complexity
set_option autoImplicit false
Formal statement
namespace RestrictedDec

namespace Supplement

/-- **Theorem 11** (adaptive finer-observation separation for the signed Naor–Yung scheme). Let `M`
be a common message space, `q` an observation with the two public conditions of §2.3 and label
length `ℓ(λ)`, and `r` any uniformly efficient map on decryption outputs. Let `R` be an efficient,
ordinarily correct residual scheme over `M`; `L` an efficient label scheme over `{0,1}^{ℓ(λ)}`
with (KC); `N` an efficient, perfectly complete NIZK for (B.4); and `S` an efficient, correct,
strongly unforgeable one-time signature. Suppose a uniform PPT sampler `W`, run independently of the
generated keys, finds valid distinct equal-length `m₀, m₁` with `q(m₀) = q(m₁)` and
`r(m₀) ≠ r(m₁)` with non-negligible probability on infinitely many security parameters. Then
1. the signed scheme `Π_q` is not in `Sec^ad(r)`;
2. there are a uniform PPT attacker `A`, which reads the sampler's coins `ρ` as its initial
   state, and a negligible `ν` such that, for every nonnegative bound `δ_R` on the honest decryption
   error of `R` (Definition 3), every `λ` and every `ρ` on which the sampler succeeds, `A` guesses the
   challenge bit of `Exp^{IND,ad}_{Π_q,𝓕_r}` correctly with probability at least
   `1 − δ_R(λ) − 2δ_L(λ) − ν(λ)`.
Nguyen–Susilo, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript sha256 6aeac40c…), Theorem 11, p.43; construction
`Π_q`, p.39.

**Formalization Note.** "Conditional on the sampler succeeding" is stated for each successful coin
vector `ρ` of the sampler (the attacker run with `ρ` as initial state); averaging over the
successful `ρ` gives the conditional probability. `δ_L` is the exact (KC) failure probability
`kcFail`. -/
theorem theorem_11 (M : ℕ → Str → Prop) (hM : MsgSpace.Found M)
    (o : Obs) (ho : o.IsPublic M) (ℓ : ℕ → ℕ)
    (hℓ : ∀ lam (x : Option Str), (∀ m, x = some m → M lam m) → (o.q lam x).length = ℓ lam)
    (r : ℕ → Option Str → Str) (hr : IsEffMap M r)
    (R : PKE) (hR : IsSchemeM M R) (hRcor : CorrectM M R)
    (L : PKE) (hL : IsSchemeM (fun lam y => y.length = ℓ lam) L) (hLkc : KeywiseCorrect L ℓ)
    (S : OTS) (hS : S.IsEfficient) (hSsuf : S.SUF) (hScor : S.Correct)
    (N : NIZK) (hN : N.IsEfficient) (hNc : N.Complete (relB4 L o))
    (W : Sampler) (hW : W.IsEfficient)
    (hWs : ¬ NoisyOWMPC.Negligible (W.succ fun lam u v => M lam u ∧ M lam v ∧ u ≠ v ∧
      u.length = v.length ∧ o.q lam (some u) = o.q lam (some v) ∧ r lam (some u) ≠ r lam (some v))) :
    ¬ SecM .ad M (famObs r) (nyAd M o R L N S) ∧
    ∃ A : Adversary, A.Valid ∧ ∃ ν : ℕ → ℝ, NoisyOWMPC.Negligible ν ∧
      ∀ δR : ℕ → ℝ, (∀ lam, 0 ≤ δR lam) → ErrBound M R δR → ∀ (lam : ℕ) (ρ : Fin (W.coins lam) → Bool),
        (M lam (W.out lam ρ).1 ∧ M lam (W.out lam ρ).2 ∧ (W.out lam ρ).1 ≠ (W.out lam ρ).2 ∧
          (W.out lam ρ).1.length = (W.out lam ρ).2.length ∧
          o.q lam (some (W.out lam ρ).1) = o.q lam (some (W.out lam ρ).2) ∧
          r lam (some (W.out lam ρ).1) ≠ r lam (some (W.out lam ρ).2)) →
        ENNReal.ofReal (1 - δR lam - 2 * kcFail L ℓ lam - ν lam) ≤
          expINDM .ad M (nyAd M o R L N S) (famObs r) A lam (List.ofFn ρ) true := by sorry

end Supplement

end RestrictedDec
Source
Nguyen–Susilo, Between CPA and CCA: Security Hierarchies for Restricted Decryption, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript sha256 6aeac40c…), Theorem 11, p.43; construction Π_q, p.39

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