Proof of Proposition 4, p. 50 — g(n; 3) − g(n; 2) = −ln 2 + 1/(1 − n/2) − 1/(1 − n) + γn
ProvedNetFeePlatform.Competition.gChar_three_sub_twologit-demandmarket-dominancep2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1platform-competition
For every and every , the characterization functions for triopoly and duopoly differ by
At a zero of , i.e. a duopoly equilibrium whose smaller platform has share , the sign of this difference is the sign of , which decides whether triopoly has an equilibrium with an even larger dominant platform.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_NetFeePlatform_Competition_Setting import Definitions.Def_NetFeePlatform_Competition_GChar
Formal statement
namespace NetFeePlatform.Competition
theorem gChar_three_sub_two (γ n : ℝ) (hn0 : 0 < n) (hn1 : n < 1) :
gChar γ 3 n - gChar γ 2 n = -Real.log 2 + 1 / (1 - n / 2) - 1 / (1 - n) + γ * n := by sorry
end NetFeePlatform.Competition
Source
Ekmekci, White & Wu, Platform Competition and Interoperability: The Net Fee Model, accepted working-paper version (December 12, 2024), pp. 49–50, Appendix E.2, proof of Proposition 4
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.