Lemma A.2 — NoG = Ker Λ, NSG = Im Λ; Π and Λ are ⟨·,·⟩_{μ,γ}-orthogonal projections of G
ProvedDecompGames.Duplication.lemma_A_2game-decompositionp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1projections
Let be a finite set of players; player has a finite strategy set , and is the set of strategy profiles. A game is a vector of payoff functions ; is the space of games. For let be a strictly positive measure on , the product measure, , and let be a co-measure vector, a strictly positive function of .
Let and (A.5)–(A.6), with as in (A.1), and let be the inner product (2.15). Then:
- (a) The -normalized games are exactly the games with for every , and exactly the kernel of ; the nonstrategic games are exactly the games with for every , and exactly the image of :
- (b) and are orthogonal projections of for : they are linear and idempotent, and for all games .
Part (b) is the orthogonality behind the direct sum of Proposition 2.10.
Differences from the source:
- generalization: standing assumptions n ≥ 2 players and |Sⁱ| ≥ 2 strategies for every player (p. 7) → any finite type of players ι and any finite strategy sets S i, of any size; reason: the result holds without these assumptions (with an empty Sⁱ the space of profiles is empty and every game is 0); every instance of the source is an instance of the Lean statement
- encoding: μⁱ a strictly positive finite measure on Sⁱ → μ i : S i → ℝ, the point masses, with 0 < μ i a for all a (IsMeasureVec); reason: a measure on a finite set is determined by its point masses; μⁱ(Sⁱ) is mass μ i = ∑ₐ μ i a
- encoding: γⁱ a co-measure, a strictly positive measure on S⁻ⁱ (Definition 2.1) → γ i : (∀ j, S j) → ℝ positive with γ i (Function.update s i a) = γ i s (IsCoMeasureVec); reason: functions on S⁻ⁱ are exactly the functions on S that do not depend on the coordinate sⁱ
- encoding: statements over s⁻ⁱ ∈ S⁻ⁱ and profiles (tⁱ, s⁻ⁱ) → statements over full profiles s : ∀ j, S j, with (tⁱ, s⁻ⁱ) written Function.update s i tⁱ; reason: the coordinate sⁱ of s is overwritten, so the quantifier ranges over the same subprofiles
- encoding: NSGⁱ: h(sⁱ, s⁻ⁱ) = ℓ(s⁻ⁱ) for some ℓ : S⁻ⁱ → ℝ (A.2) → h (Function.update s i a) = h s for all s, a (IsNSGi); reason: a function on S is of the form ℓ(s⁻ⁱ) exactly when it does not depend on sⁱ
- encoding: g nonstrategic: for each i there is ℓⁱ : S⁻ⁱ → ℝ with gⁱ(sⁱ, s⁻ⁱ) = ℓⁱ(s⁻ⁱ) (2.4) → gⁱ(Function.update s i a) = gⁱ(s) for all i, s, a (IsNonstrategic); reason: a function on S is of the form ℓⁱ(s⁻ⁱ) exactly when it does not depend on sⁱ
- encoding: Π and Λ are orthogonal projections onto G for ⟨·,·⟩{μ,γ} → Λ and Π are linear, idempotent, and ⟨Λ(g₁), Π(g₂)⟩{μ,γ} = 0 for all g₁, g₂; reason: Π = Id − Λ, so Im Λ = Ker Π and Im Π = Ker Λ; an idempotent linear map is an orthogonal projection exactly when its image is orthogonal to its kernel
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_DecompGames_Duplication_Operators
Formal statement
namespace DecompGames.Duplication
open Finset
/-- Lemma A.2, p. 25: (a) `NoG = {g : ∀ i, gⁱ ∈ NoGⁱ} = Ker Λ` (A.7) and
`NSG = {g : ∀ i, gⁱ ∈ NSGⁱ} = Im Λ` (A.8); (b) `Π` and `Λ` are orthogonal projections of `G` for
`⟨·,·⟩_{μ,γ}`. -/
theorem lemma_A_2 {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] {S : ι → Type}
[∀ i, Fintype (S i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (S i)]
(μ : ∀ i, S i → ℝ) (hμ : IsMeasureVec μ)
(γ : ι → (∀ i, S i) → ℝ) (hγ : IsCoMeasureVec γ) :
(∀ g : Game ι S, ((IsNormalized μ g ↔ ∀ i, IsNoGi μ i (g i)) ∧
(IsNormalized μ g ↔ lamGame μ g = 0)) ∧
((IsNonstrategic g ↔ ∀ i, IsNSGi i (g i)) ∧
(IsNonstrategic g ↔ g ∈ Set.range (lamGame μ)))) ∧
((IsLinearMap ℝ (lamGame μ) ∧ IsLinearMap ℝ (projGame μ)) ∧
(lamGame μ ∘ lamGame μ = lamGame μ ∧ projGame μ ∘ projGame μ = projGame μ) ∧
∀ g₁ g₂ : Game ι S, ipGame μ γ (lamGame μ g₁) (projGame μ g₂) = 0) := by sorry
end DecompGames.Duplication
Source
Abdou, Pnevmatikos, Scarsini & Venel, Decomposition of Games: Some Strategic Considerations, arXiv:1901.06048v2, p. 25, Lemma A.2, (A.7)–(A.8)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.