(5), p. 9 — the marketplace's profit at fee f ≥ 0 is f(1 − f/(2μ)) if f ≤ 2μ and 0 if f ≥ 2μ
ProvedMarketplaceLeakage.Baseline.eq_5leakagep2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1platforms
In the baseline leakage game (value , cost , switching costs uniform on , ), let be a fee and let be a seller-optimal direct price at . Then the marketplace's profit equals
This reduces the marketplace's problem to a one-dimensional maximization: at fees of or more every buyer leaks to the direct channel and the marketplace earns nothing, and below it keeps a share of transactions.
Formalization Note. As with (4), the statement is posed for rather than under the page's "Assuming ". The two branches agree at . The standing assumption is kept as a hypothesis.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MarketplaceLeakage_Baseline_Setting
Formal statement
namespace MarketplaceLeakage.Baseline
/-- (5), p. 9: for `μ > 0`, a fee `f ≥ 0` and an optimal direct price `pd` of the seller at
`f`, the marketplace's profit is `0` if `f ≥ 2μ` and `f (1 − f/(2μ))` if `f ≤ 2μ`. -/
theorem eq_5 (v c μ : ℝ) (hvc : c < v) (hμ : 0 < μ) (f pd : ℝ) (hf : 0 ≤ f)
(hpd : IsSOpt v c μ f pd) :
MProfit v μ f pd = (if 2 * μ ≤ f then 0 else f * (1 - f / (2 * μ))) := by sorry
end MarketplaceLeakage.Baseline
Source
Hagiu, Wright, Marketplace Leakage, authors' manuscript dated March 2023 (sha256 cb89cc00…3c98a6; published in Management Science, doi:10.1287/mnsc.2023.4757), p. 9, display (5)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.