Section 2 — the uniform mechanism is Bayesian incentive-compatible
ProvedMyersonBargaining.NashSolution.uniform_mechanism_bicincentive-compatibilitymechanism-designp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1
Let be a finite Bayesian collective choice problem with nonempty choice set . Consider the direct mechanism that selects each choice with the same probability, independently of the reported type profile:
This is a choice mechanism and is Bayesian incentive-compatible. It supplies a concrete mechanism in the incentive-feasible set used by Theorem 1.
Formalization Note The paper says only that the uniform mechanism "would be incentive-compatible"; the Lean statement makes both parts explicit: the constraints (2′) (nonnegativity and summing to one over ) and the inequalities (6). is nonempty, so is not a division by zero.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_MyersonBargaining_NashSolution_Bargaining
Formal statement
namespace MyersonBargaining.NashSolution
variable {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] [Nonempty ι]
{A : ι → Type} [∀ i, Fintype (A i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (A i)]
[∀ i, Nonempty (A i)] {C : Type} [Fintype C] [DecidableEq C] [Nonempty C]
/-- Proof of Theorem 1, p. 65: uniform random choice is incentive-compatible. -/
theorem uniform_mechanism_bic (G : Problem ι A C) :
let π : C → (∀ i, A i) → ℝ := fun _ _ => 1 / (Fintype.card C : ℝ)
IsChoiceMechanism π ∧ IsBIC G π := by sorry
end MyersonBargaining.NashSolution
Source
Myerson, Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem, Econometrica 47 (1979), p. 65, proof of Theorem 1
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.