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Proposition 1 (Upward Reserve Price Distortion): Rexλ~(Rex)=1R^{ex}\tilde\lambda(R^{ex})=1Rexλ~(Rex)=1, λ~<λ1\tilde\lambda<\lambda_1λ~<λ1​, Rex>RdirR^{ex}>R^{dir}Rex>Rdir (corrected: λ~\tilde\lambdaλ~ increasing under λ1\lambda_1λ1​ increasing)

Proved
AuctionsOfAuctions.proposition_1

by iris · Oct 31, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

auctionsfirst-price-auctionintermediationmechanism-designp2o-correctedp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1reserve-price

Let FFF be a regular valuation distribution on [0,1][0,1][0,1], πPdir\pi^{dir}_PπPdir​ and πPex\pi^{ex}_PπPex​ the publisher's revenues (4) and (18), λ1(x)=f(x)/(1−F(x))\lambda_1(x)=f(x)/(1-F(x))λ1​(x)=f(x)/(1−F(x)), and

λ~(x)=2F(x)f(x)[1−F(x)][3−F(x)](19).\tilde\lambda(x)=\frac{2F(x)f(x)}{[1-F(x)][3-F(x)]}\qquad(19).λ~(x)=[1−F(x)][3−F(x)]2F(x)f(x)​(19).
  1. Every maximizer RexR^{ex}Rex of πPex\pi^{ex}_PπPex​ over [0,1][0,1][0,1] lies in (0,1)(0,1)(0,1) and satisfies Rexλ~(Rex)=1R^{ex}\tilde\lambda(R^{ex})=1Rexλ~(Rex)=1.
  2. λ~(x)<λ1(x)\tilde\lambda(x)<\lambda_1(x)λ~(x)<λ1​(x) for every x∈(0,1)x\in(0,1)x∈(0,1).
  3. For every maximizer RdirR^{dir}Rdir of πPdir\pi^{dir}_PπPdir​ and every maximizer RexR^{ex}Rex of πPex\pi^{ex}_PπPex​ over [0,1][0,1][0,1],
Rdir<Rex.R^{dir}<R^{ex}.Rdir<Rex.
  1. If moreover λ1\lambda_1λ1​ is strictly increasing on (0,1)(0,1)(0,1), then λ~\tilde\lambdaλ~ is strictly increasing on [0,1)[0,1)[0,1).

The presence of competing exchanges pushes the publisher's optimal reserve price above the direct (Myerson) reserve; this is the paper's core result and the source of the efficiency loss.

Differences from the source:

  • reading: valuations drawn iid from a distribution FFF with support [0,1][0,1][0,1] (p.7) → F(x)=∫0xfF(x)=\int_0^x fF(x)=∫0x​f, with fff continuous on [0,1][0,1][0,1], f≥0f\ge0f≥0 on [0,1][0,1][0,1], f>0f>0f>0 on (0,1)(0,1)(0,1) and ∫01f=1\int_0^1 f=1∫01​f=1; reason: the paper writes f=F′f=F'f=F′, divides by f(x)f(x)f(x) for x∈(0,1)x\in(0,1)x∈(0,1) and differentiates its revenue integrals in RRR (A18), which uses a continuous density; f(0)=0f(0)=0f(0)=0 and f(1)=0f(1)=0f(1)=0 are allowed
  • encoding: Stieltjes integrals ∫g dFk\int g\,dF^k∫gdFk in (3), (4), (5), (13), (18) → ∫g(x) kF(x)k−1f(x) dx\int g(x)\,kF(x)^{k-1}f(x)\,dx∫g(x)kF(x)k−1f(x)dx (interval integrals); reason: FFF is absolutely continuous with density fff; same instances
  • generalization: FFF regular: ψ(x)=x−(1−F(x))/f(x)\psi(x)=x-(1-F(x))/f(x)ψ(x)=x−(1−F(x))/f(x) "is increasing" (p.7) → ψ\psiψ weakly increasing on (0,1)(0,1)(0,1) (MonotoneOn); reason: weak monotonicity is Myerson's regularity; the strict reading is a special case, and ψ\psiψ is defined where f>0f>0f>0
  • encoding: a reserve price RRR → R∈[0,1]R\in[0,1]R∈[0,1]; reason: valuations lie in [0,1][0,1][0,1]: a reserve below 000 acts as 000 and a reserve above 111 sells nothing, so the publisher's choice set is [0,1][0,1][0,1]
  • generalization: the optimal reserve price RexR^{ex}Rex (and RdirR^{dir}Rdir), written as if unique → every maximizer on [0,1][0,1][0,1] of the transcribed revenue (IsMaxOn); no uniqueness, interiority or first-order condition assumed; reason: when the maximizer is unique this is the paper's statement; under weak regularity maximizers need not be unique
  • correction: "λ~\tilde\lambdaλ~ is the following increasing function" (for every regular FFF) → λ~\tilde\lambdaλ~ strictly increasing on [0,1)[0,1)[0,1) when λ1\lambda_1λ1​ is strictly increasing on (0,1)(0,1)(0,1) (clause 4); reason: false for some regular FFF: the distribution with 1/λ1(x)=(1−x)(0.05(1−x)+4x2(1−x)+x3)1/\lambda_1(x)=(1-x)(0.05(1-x)+4x^2(1-x)+x^3)1/λ1​(x)=(1−x)(0.05(1−x)+4x2(1−x)+x3) has a density that is continuous and positive on [0,1][0,1][0,1] (f(0)=20f(0)=20f(0)=20, f(1−)≈0.034f(1^-)\approx0.034f(1−)≈0.034) and is regular (the derivative of 1/λ11/\lambda_11/λ1​ stays below 0.81<10.81<10.81<1), but λ~≈10.41,6.46,4.31,3.36,3.00\tilde\lambda\approx10.41,6.46,4.31,3.36,3.00λ~≈10.41,6.46,4.31,3.36,3.00 at x=0.1,…,0.5x=0.1,\dots,0.5x=0.1,…,0.5; the paper's proof (A23)–(A25) uses (A8), i.e. λ1\lambda_1λ1​ increasing, the hypothesis of Claim 1
  • reading: "λ~(x)<λ1(x)\tilde\lambda(x)<\lambda_1(x)λ~(x)<λ1​(x)" → for every x∈(0,1)x\in(0,1)x∈(0,1); reason: at x=0x=0x=0, λ~(0)=0\tilde\lambda(0)=0λ~(0)=0 and λ1(0)=f(0)\lambda_1(0)=f(0)λ1​(0)=f(0) may be 000; at x=1x=1x=1 both are undefined
  • reading: "RexR^{ex}Rex satisfies Rexλ~(Rex)=1R^{ex}\tilde\lambda(R^{ex})=1Rexλ~(Rex)=1" → Rex∈(0,1)R^{ex}\in(0,1)Rex∈(0,1) and Rexλ~(Rex)=1R^{ex}\tilde\lambda(R^{ex})=1Rexλ~(Rex)=1; reason: interiority is where λ~\tilde\lambdaλ~ is defined and is part of the claim that the maximizer solves the equation
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_AuctionsOfAuctions_Model
Formal statement
namespace AuctionsOfAuctions

/-- **Proposition 1 (Upward Reserve Price Distortion)**, Zeithammer–Choi, *Auctions of Auctions*,
Management Science (2024), doi:10.1287/mnsc.2024.05233, §4.2, p.16 (PDF 17). For a regular
valuation distribution:
(a) every maximizer `R^ex` of `π^ex_P` over `[0, 1]` lies in `(0, 1)` and satisfies
`R^ex λ̃(R^ex) = 1`, with the pseudo hazard `λ̃` of (19);
(b) `λ̃(x) < λ_1(x)` for every `x ∈ (0, 1)`;
(c) `R^dir < R^ex` for every maximizer `R^dir` of `π^dir_P` and every maximizer `R^ex` of
`π^ex_P` over `[0, 1]`;
(d) (corrected) if moreover `λ_1` is strictly increasing on `(0, 1)`, then `λ̃` is strictly
increasing on `[0, 1)`.

**Formalization Note.**
* "The optimal reserve price" is any maximizer on `[0, 1]` (`IsMaxOn`); uniqueness is not assumed.
* The page calls `λ̃` "increasing" for every regular `F`; this is false (a regular `F` with
  `1/λ_1(x) = (1 − x)(0.05(1 − x) + 4x²(1 − x) + x³)`, whose density is continuous on `[0, 1]`
  and positive there, has `λ̃ ≈ 10.41, 6.46, 4.31, 3.36, 3.00` at `x = 0.1, …, 0.5`). Clause (d) adds the hypothesis of Claim 1 (`λ_1` increasing), which the
  paper's proof (A23)–(A25) uses through (A8). -/
theorem proposition_1 (D : ValuationDist) (hreg : D.IsRegular) :
    (∀ Re ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1, IsMaxOn D.revEx (Set.Icc 0 1) Re →
      Re ∈ Set.Ioo (0 : ℝ) 1 ∧ Re * D.lamTilde Re = 1) ∧
    (∀ x ∈ Set.Ioo (0 : ℝ) 1, D.lamTilde x < D.lam 1 x) ∧
    (∀ Rd ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1, ∀ Re ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1,
      IsMaxOn D.revDir (Set.Icc 0 1) Rd → IsMaxOn D.revEx (Set.Icc 0 1) Re → Rd < Re) ∧
    (StrictMonoOn (D.lam 1) (Set.Ioo 0 1) → StrictMonoOn D.lamTilde (Set.Ico 0 1)) := by sorry

end AuctionsOfAuctions
Source
Zeithammer–Choi, Auctions of Auctions, Management Science (2024), doi:10.1287/mnsc.2024.05233, §4.2, Proposition 1, eq. (19), p.16 (PDF 17); proof A1.4, pp.39–40
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 31, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by iris · Oct 31, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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