Proposition 1 (Upward Reserve Price Distortion): , , (corrected: increasing under increasing)
ProvedAuctionsOfAuctions.proposition_1auctionsfirst-price-auctionintermediationmechanism-designp2o-correctedp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-strengthenedp2o-v1reserve-price
Let be a regular valuation distribution on , and the publisher's revenues (4) and (18), , and
- Every maximizer of over lies in and satisfies .
- for every .
- For every maximizer of and every maximizer of over ,
- If moreover is strictly increasing on , then is strictly increasing on .
The presence of competing exchanges pushes the publisher's optimal reserve price above the direct (Myerson) reserve; this is the paper's core result and the source of the efficiency loss.
Differences from the source:
- reading: valuations drawn iid from a distribution with support (p.7) → , with continuous on , on , on and ; reason: the paper writes , divides by for and differentiates its revenue integrals in (A18), which uses a continuous density; and are allowed
- encoding: Stieltjes integrals in (3), (4), (5), (13), (18) → (interval integrals); reason: is absolutely continuous with density ; same instances
- generalization: regular: "is increasing" (p.7) → weakly increasing on (MonotoneOn); reason: weak monotonicity is Myerson's regularity; the strict reading is a special case, and is defined where
- encoding: a reserve price → ; reason: valuations lie in : a reserve below acts as and a reserve above sells nothing, so the publisher's choice set is
- generalization: the optimal reserve price (and ), written as if unique → every maximizer on of the transcribed revenue (IsMaxOn); no uniqueness, interiority or first-order condition assumed; reason: when the maximizer is unique this is the paper's statement; under weak regularity maximizers need not be unique
- correction: " is the following increasing function" (for every regular ) → strictly increasing on when is strictly increasing on (clause 4); reason: false for some regular : the distribution with has a density that is continuous and positive on (, ) and is regular (the derivative of stays below ), but at ; the paper's proof (A23)–(A25) uses (A8), i.e. increasing, the hypothesis of Claim 1
- reading: "" → for every ; reason: at , and may be ; at both are undefined
- reading: " satisfies " → and ; reason: interiority is where is defined and is part of the claim that the maximizer solves the equation
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_AuctionsOfAuctions_Model
Formal statement
namespace AuctionsOfAuctions
/-- **Proposition 1 (Upward Reserve Price Distortion)**, Zeithammer–Choi, *Auctions of Auctions*,
Management Science (2024), doi:10.1287/mnsc.2024.05233, §4.2, p.16 (PDF 17). For a regular
valuation distribution:
(a) every maximizer `R^ex` of `π^ex_P` over `[0, 1]` lies in `(0, 1)` and satisfies
`R^ex λ̃(R^ex) = 1`, with the pseudo hazard `λ̃` of (19);
(b) `λ̃(x) < λ_1(x)` for every `x ∈ (0, 1)`;
(c) `R^dir < R^ex` for every maximizer `R^dir` of `π^dir_P` and every maximizer `R^ex` of
`π^ex_P` over `[0, 1]`;
(d) (corrected) if moreover `λ_1` is strictly increasing on `(0, 1)`, then `λ̃` is strictly
increasing on `[0, 1)`.
**Formalization Note.**
* "The optimal reserve price" is any maximizer on `[0, 1]` (`IsMaxOn`); uniqueness is not assumed.
* The page calls `λ̃` "increasing" for every regular `F`; this is false (a regular `F` with
`1/λ_1(x) = (1 − x)(0.05(1 − x) + 4x²(1 − x) + x³)`, whose density is continuous on `[0, 1]`
and positive there, has `λ̃ ≈ 10.41, 6.46, 4.31, 3.36, 3.00` at `x = 0.1, …, 0.5`). Clause (d) adds the hypothesis of Claim 1 (`λ_1` increasing), which the
paper's proof (A23)–(A25) uses through (A8). -/
theorem proposition_1 (D : ValuationDist) (hreg : D.IsRegular) :
(∀ Re ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1, IsMaxOn D.revEx (Set.Icc 0 1) Re →
Re ∈ Set.Ioo (0 : ℝ) 1 ∧ Re * D.lamTilde Re = 1) ∧
(∀ x ∈ Set.Ioo (0 : ℝ) 1, D.lamTilde x < D.lam 1 x) ∧
(∀ Rd ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1, ∀ Re ∈ Set.Icc (0 : ℝ) 1,
IsMaxOn D.revDir (Set.Icc 0 1) Rd → IsMaxOn D.revEx (Set.Icc 0 1) Re → Rd < Re) ∧
(StrictMonoOn (D.lam 1) (Set.Ioo 0 1) → StrictMonoOn D.lamTilde (Set.Ico 0 1)) := by sorry
end AuctionsOfAuctions
Source
Zeithammer–Choi, Auctions of Auctions, Management Science (2024), doi:10.1287/mnsc.2024.05233, §4.2, Proposition 1, eq. (19), p.16 (PDF 17); proof A1.4, pp.39–40
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.