Equation (2) — a playerwise probability vector
ProvedHartSchmeidler.Finite.eq2_exists_player_vectorcorrelated-equilibriumfinite-gamesp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1probability-vectors
Fix a player of a finite game and any nonnegative array indexed by two pure strategies of that player. There is a probability vector on such that, for every fixed profile of the other players,
This is equation (2), the playerwise cancellation used before forming the product strategy.
Formalization Note The array is merely nonnegative: a slice of player II's single lottery over all triples need not itself sum to one. A full profile supplies , and both payoff terms replace its th coordinate, so their values do not depend on its original th coordinate.
Preamble
import Definitions.Def_HartSchmeidler_Finite_Game
Formal statement
namespace HartSchmeidler.Finite
open Finset
/-- Equation (2), p. 20: the lemma supplies a lottery on one player's
strategies for every nonnegative slice of player II's strategy. -/
theorem eq2_exists_player_vector {ι : Type*} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]
{S : ι → Type*} [∀ j, Fintype (S j)] [∀ j, DecidableEq (S j)]
[∀ j, Nonempty (S j)] (h : ι → (∀ j, S j) → ℝ)
(i : ι) (y : S i → S i → ℝ) (hy : ∀ r t, 0 ≤ y r t) :
∃ x : S i → ℝ, AGT.IsLottery x ∧
∀ s : ∀ j, S j,
∑ r, x r * ∑ t, y r t *
(h i (Function.update s i r) - h i (Function.update s i t)) = 0 := by sorry
end HartSchmeidler.Finite
Source
Hart and Schmeidler, Existence of Correlated Equilibria, Math. Oper. Res. 14 (1989), p. 20, proof of Theorem 1, equation (2); https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.14.1.18
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.