App. B.3, p. 18 — with a unit fee, T profits iff v > v_T = (c + t)/(1 − f)
ProvedRetailerMarketplace.UnitFee.b3_entry_thresholdFix a marginal cost , an ad valorem fee , a per-unit fee and a steering share , and write
For every product valuation :
- the third-party seller's profit in an SBT market is positive exactly above the threshold,
- her margin in an SBMT market, with the price of (B.1), is positive exactly above the same threshold,
- she enters (does not make a loss) exactly from the threshold on: .
This is the entry analysis of Appendix B.3: a per-unit fee acts on the seller like a marginal-cost increase, so the whole entry analysis of the baseline model carries over with redefined as .
Formalization Note. The page's claims are strict ("positive profits", ""), and items 1–2 state them strictly; item 3 records the zero-profit entry convention used for the marketplace set, as in the paper's Lemma 1. The SBMT claim concerns the margin printed on the page, not the profit , which vanishes identically at . is the paper's standing Assumption 1; the equivalence in item 2 uses only .
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_RetailerMarketplace_UnitFee_Model
namespace RetailerMarketplace.UnitFee
/-- App. B.3, p. 18: with a unit fee `t`, T's SBT profit `(1 - f) v - c - t` and her SBMT margin
`p̄_T (1 - f) - c - t` (with `p̄_T` from (B.1)) are positive exactly when `v > v_T = (c + t)/(1 - f)`;
and T's entry set (entry at zero profit) is `[v_T, ∞)`. -/
theorem b3_entry_threshold (c f t lam : ℝ) (hc : 0 < c) (hf : f ∈ Set.Ico (0 : ℝ) 1)
(ht : 0 ≤ t) (hlam : lam ∈ Set.Icc (1 / 2 : ℝ) 1) (v : ℝ) :
(0 < piSBT_T c f t v ↔ vT c f t < v) ∧
(0 < pbarT c f t lam v * (1 - f) - c - t ↔ vT c f t < v) ∧
(v ∈ mp c f t ↔ vT c f t ≤ v) := by sorry
end RetailerMarketplace.UnitFee
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.