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Script trees, honest Taproot outputs, and the two hardness assumptions of the script path

Definition
BitcoinTapSoundness

by pitimespi · Oct 29, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bip341bitcoinbitcoin-mainnetformal-verificationmerklesoundnesstagged-hashtaproot

Names over the Taproot mission's BitcoinTaproot; nothing of Core is re-transcribed.

Sha256Collision — there exist two different byte strings with the same sha256.

TapTree — a binary tree whose leaves carry a leaf version byte and a script (the tree the output's creator built, BIP341). TapTree.hash is tapleafHash version script at a leaf and tapbranchHash of the children's hashes at a branch; TapTree.leaves lists the leaf hashes in order; TapTree.subtreesAt T d lists the subtrees at depth ddd (the tree itself at depth 0, nothing below a leaf).

TweakCollision q parity P — two different 32-byte tweak scalars that both pass xonlyTweakAddCheck q parity P (Core's secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check): both carry the internal point PPP to the output key qqq with the given parity. This is a discrete-logarithm relation (t1−t2t_1 - t_2t1​−t2​ times GGG is the point at infinity, with t1≠t2t_1 \ne t_2t1​=t2​ below the group order), which the model does not attempt to rule out.

HonestOutput q internal32 parity T — checkTapTweak q internal32 T.hash parity = true: the output key qqq is the internal key tweaked by the root of TTT, with parity parity (XOnlyPubKey::CheckTapTweak).

controlInternalKey control — bytes 1 to 32 of a control block; controlParity control — bit 0 of its first byte. These are the two fields VerifyTaprootCommitment reads from the control block besides the path.

Formalization Note. tagged, tapleafHash, tapbranchHash, controlNodes, taprootMerkleRoot, tapTweakHash, xonlyTweakAddCheck, checkTapTweak, verifyTaprootCommitment are the Taproot mission's; sha256, taggedHash, liftX, beVal the serialization and signature missions'. Only Std is imported.

Deprecated. Superseded by BitcoinTapSoundnessV2 (revision 2, BitcoinTapSoundnessV2): this revision's collision alternatives were closed propositions (Sha256Collision, and TweakCollision without a length constraint), which are provable by counting and so made the statement trivially true; the V2 declarations name the colliding strings and the two 32-byte tweaks explicitly, computed from the inputs.

Definition code
import Definitions.Def_BitcoinTaproot

/-!
# Soundness of the Taproot script path

A Taproot output commits to a tree of scripts through its tweaked key. A spender opens one leaf by
presenting a control block: the internal key, a parity bit, and a Merkle path. The claim behind the
design is that nobody can open a leaf the output's creator did not put in the tree. In the model
that claim reduces to two hardness assumptions, which this file names so that the theorem can be
stated as a reduction: a collision of SHA-256, or two different tweak scalars carrying the same
internal key to the same output key (a discrete-logarithm relation on secp256k1).
-/

namespace BitcoinTapSoundness

open BitcoinSer BitcoinTaproot

/-- A collision of SHA-256: two different messages with the same digest. -/
def Sha256Collision : Prop := ∃ x y : Bytes, x ≠ y ∧ sha256 x = sha256 y

/-- A tree of tapscript leaves as the output's creator built it (BIP341). -/
inductive TapTree where
  | leaf (version : Byte) (script : Bytes)
  | branch (l r : TapTree)

/-- The hash of a tree: `ComputeTapleafHash` for a leaf, `ComputeTapbranchHash` of the children's
hashes for a branch. -/
def TapTree.hash : TapTree → Bytes
  | .leaf v s => tapleafHash v s
  | .branch l r => tapbranchHash l.hash r.hash

/-- The leaf hashes committed in a tree. -/
def TapTree.leaves : TapTree → List Bytes
  | .leaf v s => [tapleafHash v s]
  | .branch l r => l.leaves ++ r.leaves

/-- The subtrees at depth `d`. -/
def TapTree.subtreesAt : TapTree → Nat → List TapTree
  | T, 0 => [T]
  | .leaf _ _, _ + 1 => []
  | .branch l r, d + 1 => l.subtreesAt d ++ r.subtreesAt d

/-- Two different tweak scalars (32-byte strings) that both carry the internal point `P` to the
output key `q` with parity `parity` under `secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check`: a
discrete-logarithm relation, outside the model's reach. -/
def TweakCollision (q : Bytes) (parity : Bool) (P : Nat × Nat) : Prop :=
  ∃ t₁ t₂ : Bytes, t₁ ≠ t₂ ∧ xonlyTweakAddCheck q parity P t₁ = true ∧ xonlyTweakAddCheck q parity P t₂ = true

/-- An honestly constructed Taproot output: `q` is the tweak of the internal key `internal32` by the
tree's root, with the given parity (`XOnlyPubKey::CheckTapTweak`). -/
def HonestOutput (q internal32 : Bytes) (parity : Bool) (T : TapTree) : Prop :=
  checkTapTweak q internal32 T.hash parity = true

/-- The internal key of a control block (bytes 1 to 32). -/
def controlInternalKey (control : Bytes) : Bytes := (control.drop 1).take 32

/-- The parity bit of a control block (bit 0 of its first byte). -/
def controlParity (control : Bytes) : Bool := decide ((control.getD 0 0).toNat % 2 = 1)

end BitcoinTapSoundness
Source
Bitcoin Core a773e1e33b349dc819b5a0edc1c7a4839dc73b48: VerifyTaprootCommitment, ComputeTaprootMerkleRoot, ComputeTapleafHash, ComputeTapbranchHash (src/script/interpreter.cpp: https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/a773e1e33b349dc819b5a0edc1c7a4839dc73b48/src/script/interpreter.cpp); XOnlyPubKey::CheckTapTweak, ComputeTapTweakHash (src/pubkey.cpp); secp256k1_xonly_pubkey_tweak_add_check; BIP341
Read-back

What the Lean code literally says, in plain math · claude-fable-5-1 (independent sub-agent, blind: Lean code + auditor instructions only)

Read-back: Def_BitcoinTapSoundness.lean

Throughout, a byte is an 8-bit value, Bytes\mathsf{Bytes}Bytes is the set of finite byte strings (any length, including empty), ∥\|∥ is concatenation, SHA256\mathrm{SHA256}SHA256 is the bundle's own executable SHA-256 (a total function from Bytes\mathsf{Bytes}Bytes to 32-byte strings), utf8(⋅)\mathrm{utf8}(\cdot)utf8(⋅) is UTF-8 encoding of a string, and Taggedτ(m):=SHA256(SHA256(utf8(τ))∥SHA256(utf8(τ))∥m)\mathrm{Tagged}_{\tau}(m) := \mathrm{SHA256}(\mathrm{SHA256}(\mathrm{utf8}(\tau)) \| \mathrm{SHA256}(\mathrm{utf8}(\tau)) \| m)Taggedτ​(m):=SHA256(SHA256(utf8(τ))∥SHA256(utf8(τ))∥m). CS(ℓ)\mathrm{CS}(\ell)CS(ℓ) is the compact-size encoding of ℓ\ellℓ (one byte if ℓ<253\ell < 253ℓ<253; 0xfd0xfd0xfd + 2 little-endian bytes if ℓ≤65535\ell \le 65535ℓ≤65535; 0xfe0xfe0xfe + 4 bytes if ℓ≤232−1\ell \le 2^{32}-1ℓ≤232−1; 0xff0xff0xff + 8 bytes of ℓ mod 264\ell \bmod 2^{64}ℓmod264 otherwise). LeafHash(v,s):=Tagged“TapLeaf”([v]∥CS(∣s∣)∥s)\mathrm{LeafHash}(v,s) := \mathrm{Tagged}_{\text{``TapLeaf''}}([v] \| \mathrm{CS}(|s|) \| s)LeafHash(v,s):=Tagged“TapLeaf”​([v]∥CS(∣s∣)∥s) with the byte vvv used as given. ≺\prec≺ is lexicographic order on byte strings (first differing byte decides by numeric value; a proper prefix is smaller; no string is ≺\prec≺ itself) and BranchHash(a,b):=Tagged“TapBranch”(if a≺b then a∥b else b∥a)\mathrm{BranchHash}(a,b) := \mathrm{Tagged}_{\text{``TapBranch''}}(\text{if } a \prec b \text{ then } a\|b \text{ else } b\|a)BranchHash(a,b):=Tagged“TapBranch”​(if a≺b then a∥b else b∥a), which is symmetric.

Sha256Collision

A closed proposition (no parameters):

Sha256Collision  :=  ∃ x,y∈Bytes.  x≠y  ∧  SHA256(x)=SHA256(y).\mathsf{Sha256Collision} \;:=\; \exists\, x, y \in \mathsf{Bytes}.\; x \neq y \;\wedge\; \mathrm{SHA256}(x) = \mathrm{SHA256}(y).Sha256Collision:=∃x,y∈Bytes.x=y∧SHA256(x)=SHA256(y).

The two strings may have any lengths (not necessarily equal); "x≠yx \neq yx=y" is inequality of byte strings. Because SHA256\mathrm{SHA256}SHA256 here is a specific total function from the infinite set Bytes\mathsf{Bytes}Bytes to the finite set of 32-byte strings, this proposition's truth value is a fixed mathematical fact (by counting, such a pair exists); it is a definition, not an axiom or assumption, and nothing in the file postulates it to be false.

TapTree

An inductively defined type of finite binary trees: a tap tree is either a leaf carrying a byte vvv (the "version") and a byte string sss (the "script", any length), or a branch with exactly two ordered subtrees LLL and RRR (both tap trees). There are no other constructors; every internal node has exactly two children; a single leaf is a tap tree. No constraint is placed on vvv or sss.

TapTree.hash

The hash of a tap tree, a 32-byte string, defined by recursion:

hash(leaf(v,s)):=LeafHash(v,s),hash(branch(L,R)):=BranchHash(hash(L),hash(R)).\mathrm{hash}(\mathrm{leaf}(v,s)) := \mathrm{LeafHash}(v,s), \qquad \mathrm{hash}(\mathrm{branch}(L,R)) := \mathrm{BranchHash}(\mathrm{hash}(L), \mathrm{hash}(R)).hash(leaf(v,s)):=LeafHash(v,s),hash(branch(L,R)):=BranchHash(hash(L),hash(R)).

Since BranchHash\mathrm{BranchHash}BranchHash orders its two inputs lexicographically before hashing, hash(branch(L,R))=hash(branch(R,L))\mathrm{hash}(\mathrm{branch}(L,R)) = \mathrm{hash}(\mathrm{branch}(R,L))hash(branch(L,R))=hash(branch(R,L)).

TapTree.leaves

The list of leaf hashes of a tap tree, defined by recursion:

leaves(leaf(v,s)):=[LeafHash(v,s)],leaves(branch(L,R)):=leaves(L) ∥ leaves(R).\mathrm{leaves}(\mathrm{leaf}(v,s)) := [\mathrm{LeafHash}(v,s)], \qquad \mathrm{leaves}(\mathrm{branch}(L,R)) := \mathrm{leaves}(L) \,\|\, \mathrm{leaves}(R).leaves(leaf(v,s)):=[LeafHash(v,s)],leaves(branch(L,R)):=leaves(L)∥leaves(R).

It lists 32-byte hashes (not the pairs (v,s)(v,s)(v,s)), left to right, keeping repetitions. It is never empty.

TapTree.subtreesAt

The list of subtrees of a tap tree TTT at depth ddd, defined by recursion on TTT and ddd:

subtreesAt(T,0):=[T] (for any T),subtreesAt(leaf(v,s),d+1):=[ ],subtreesAt(branch(L,R),d+1):=subtreesAt(L,d) ∥ subtreesAt(R,d).\mathrm{subtreesAt}(T, 0) := [T] \ \text{(for any } T\text{)},\qquad \mathrm{subtreesAt}(\mathrm{leaf}(v,s), d+1) := [\,],\qquad \mathrm{subtreesAt}(\mathrm{branch}(L,R), d+1) := \mathrm{subtreesAt}(L,d) \,\|\, \mathrm{subtreesAt}(R,d).subtreesAt(T,0):=[T] (for any T),subtreesAt(leaf(v,s),d+1):=[],subtreesAt(branch(L,R),d+1):=subtreesAt(L,d)∥subtreesAt(R,d).

So it lists, left to right, exactly the subtrees whose root is at depth ddd below the root of TTT; it is empty when ddd is larger than the depth of every node reached (e.g. a single leaf at any d≥1d \ge 1d≥1).

TweakCollision

For a byte string qqq, a Boolean π\piπ and a point P=(Px,Py)P = (P_x, P_y)P=(Px​,Py​) (a pair of natural numbers, not required to lie on the curve or be reduced mod ppp):

TweakCollision(q,π,P):=∃ t1,t2∈Bytes.  t1≠t2  ∧  TweakCheck(q,π,P,t1)=true  ∧  TweakCheck(q,π,P,t2)=true,\mathrm{TweakCollision}(q, \pi, P) := \exists\, t_1, t_2 \in \mathsf{Bytes}.\; t_1 \neq t_2 \;\wedge\; \mathrm{TweakCheck}(q,\pi,P,t_1) = \mathrm{true} \;\wedge\; \mathrm{TweakCheck}(q,\pi,P,t_2) = \mathrm{true},TweakCollision(q,π,P):=∃t1​,t2​∈Bytes.t1​=t2​∧TweakCheck(q,π,P,t1​)=true∧TweakCheck(q,π,P,t2​)=true,

where TweakCheck(q,π,P,t)\mathrm{TweakCheck}(q,\pi,P,t)TweakCheck(q,π,P,t) is: let t^:=be(t)\hat t := \mathrm{be}(t)t^:=be(t) be the big-endian value of ttt (any length; empty ↦0\mapsto 0↦0; leading zero bytes do not change it); if t^≥n\hat t \ge nt^≥n (with nnn the fixed secp256k1 group-order constant), the result is false; otherwise let Q:=P⊕(t^⋅G)Q := P \oplus (\hat t \cdot G)Q:=P⊕(t^⋅G), using the file's affine addition formulas modulo p=2256−232−977p = 2^{256} - 2^{32} - 977p=2256−232−977 (identity ∞\infty∞; doubling when the abscissas agree mod ppp and the ordinates do not sum to 000 mod ppp, else ∞\infty∞; chord formula otherwise; Fermat inversion with 0−1:=00^{-1} := 00−1:=0) and double-and-add scalar multiplication with 257 steps (0⋅G=∞0 \cdot G = \infty0⋅G=∞) from the fixed base point GGG; if Q=∞Q = \inftyQ=∞, false; otherwise true exactly when the 32-byte big-endian encoding of Qx mod 2256Q_x \bmod 2^{256}Qx​mod2256 equals qqq as a byte string (so qqq must have length 32) and (QyQ_yQy​ odd) ⇔\Leftrightarrow⇔ π\piπ. The witnesses t1,t2t_1, t_2t1​,t2​ are required to differ only as byte strings; no length (such as 32) is imposed on them, and since the check reads them only through be(⋅)\mathrm{be}(\cdot)be(⋅), if some ttt passes the check then ttt and 0x00∥t0x00 \| t0x00∥t are two distinct witnesses. Hence TweakCollision(q,π,P)\mathrm{TweakCollision}(q,\pi,P)TweakCollision(q,π,P) holds exactly when at least one byte string passes TweakCheck(q,π,P,⋅)\mathrm{TweakCheck}(q,\pi,P,\cdot)TweakCheck(q,π,P,⋅).

HonestOutput

For byte strings qqq, KKK, a Boolean π\piπ and a tap tree TTT:

HonestOutput(q,K,π,T):=[CheckTapTweak(q,K,hash(T),π)=true],\mathrm{HonestOutput}(q, K, \pi, T) := \bigl[\mathrm{CheckTapTweak}(q, K, \mathrm{hash}(T), \pi) = \mathrm{true}\bigr],HonestOutput(q,K,π,T):=[CheckTapTweak(q,K,hash(T),π)=true],

where CheckTapTweak(q,K,r,π)\mathrm{CheckTapTweak}(q,K,r,\pi)CheckTapTweak(q,K,r,π) is: compute liftX(be(K))\mathrm{liftX}(\mathrm{be}(K))liftX(be(K)) — undefined if be(K)≥p\mathrm{be}(K) \ge pbe(K)≥p; otherwise with x:=be(K)x := \mathrm{be}(K)x:=be(K) and y0:=(x3+7)(p+1)/4 mod py_0 := (x^3+7)^{(p+1)/4} \bmod py0​:=(x3+7)(p+1)/4modp, if y02≡x3+7(modp)y_0^2 \equiv x^3 + 7 \pmod py02​≡x3+7(modp) it is the point (x,y)(x, y)(x,y) with y=y0y = y_0y=y0​ if y0y_0y0​ is even and y=(p−y0) mod py = (p - y_0) \bmod py=(p−y0​)modp otherwise, and undefined if not. If undefined, CheckTapTweak\mathrm{CheckTapTweak}CheckTapTweak is false. Otherwise, with PPP that point, it is TweakCheck(q,π,P,Tagged“TapTweak”(K∥r))\mathrm{TweakCheck}\bigl(q, \pi, P, \mathrm{Tagged}_{\text{``TapTweak''}}(K \| r)\bigr)TweakCheck(q,π,P,Tagged“TapTweak”​(K∥r)) as defined above. No length is imposed on KKK or qqq by the definition itself; the check can only succeed if qqq is exactly 32 bytes, and KKK enters only through its big-endian value (any length) and through its raw bytes inside the tweak hash input.

controlInternalKey

For a byte string ccc: controlInternalKey(c):=(drop the first byte of c), then take the first 32 bytes\mathrm{controlInternalKey}(c) := (\text{drop the first byte of } c)\text{, then take the first 32 bytes}controlInternalKey(c):=(drop the first byte of c), then take the first 32 bytes. If ∣c∣≥33|c| \ge 33∣c∣≥33 this is exactly the bytes at zero-based positions 111 through 323232; if 1≤∣c∣<331 \le |c| < 331≤∣c∣<33 it is the ∣c∣−1|c| - 1∣c∣−1 bytes after the first; if ccc is empty it is the empty string.

controlParity

For a byte string ccc: controlParity(c):=true\mathrm{controlParity}(c) := \mathrm{true}controlParity(c):=true if the numeric value of the first byte of ccc is odd, and false\mathrm{false}false otherwise; if ccc is empty the first byte defaults to 000, so the result is false\mathrm{false}false.

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