§4, p. 34 — a strict SWF with PO and IIA underlying a strategy-proof procedure satisfies NNR
ProvedStrategyProofArrow.Correspondence.nnr_of_underliesarrowp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1social-choicestrategy-proofness
Let , , let be a strict strategy-proof voting procedure, and let be a strict social welfare function that underlies and satisfies Pareto optimality and IIA. Then satisfies non-negative response: for every alternative , with , and all strict ballot sets such that, for every individual , and is ranked by at least as high against every as by ,
where and .
This is the paper's "third fact" about Gibbard's result, which completes the proof of Lemma 8.
Formalization Note NNR is formalized for every and for arbitrary (any number of individuals may move up); the paper's argument treats a change in a single ballot. The standing hypotheses , of §4 are kept.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_StrategyProofArrow_Correspondence_Basic
Formal statement
namespace StrategyProofArrow.Correspondence
theorem nnr_of_underlies {ι A : Type*} [Fintype ι] [Fintype A] [DecidableEq ι] [DecidableEq A]
(hn : 2 ≤ Fintype.card ι) (hm : 3 ≤ Fintype.card A)
(v : StrongProfile ι A → A) (hsp : StrategyProof v)
(u : StrongProfile ι A → StrongOrder A) (hu : Underlies u v) (hpo : PO u) (hiia : IIA u) :
NNR u := by sorry
end StrategyProofArrow.Correspondence
Source
Satterthwaite, Strategy-proofness and Arrow's Conditions, Northwestern Discussion Paper No. 122 (rev. Dec. 12, 1974), §4, p. 34 ("Third, note that …")
Human review
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