Lemma 2.7, p. 7 — decomposition of the minimizer set
ProvedNashVecOpt.SharedConstraint.lemma_2_7ordering-conep2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1pareto-optimalityvector-optimization
Let be the arbitrary cost profile and the arbitrary shared feasible set of an -player game with . With the augmented objective , the full-cone minimizers equal the intersection of the player-cone minimizers:
This is the paper's decomposition of the entire Pareto minimizer set, including when the feasible set is empty.
Formalization Note The cones are exactly (6) and (7), and the minimizer notion is Definition 2.3. The stated is the paper's standing convention; the identity can be proved without using it.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_NashVecOpt_SharedConstraint_Model
Formal statement
namespace NashVecOpt.SharedConstraint
variable {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι]
{E : ι → Type} [∀ i, AddCommGroup (E i)] [∀ i, Module ℝ (E i)]
/-- Lemma 2.7, p. 7: the full-cone minimizers equal the intersection of the player-cone
minimizers. -/
theorem lemma_2_7 (hN : 2 ≤ Fintype.card ι) (f : ι → (∀ j, E j) → ℝ)
(X : Set (∀ j, E j)) :
vArgMin (orderCone (E := E)) (obj f) X =
⋂ i, vArgMin (coneI (E := E) i) (obj f) X := by sorry
end NashVecOpt.SharedConstraint
Source
Feinstein, Rudloff, Characterizing and Computing the Set of Nash Equilibria via Vector Optimization, arXiv:2109.14932v5, p. 7, Lemma 2.7
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.