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(20), p. 29 — the monopoly objective (5) equals (w₀ − c_v) Σ P(m_i) min{N, n*_{HV,i}} − c_f N

Proved
AVRideHail.MonopolyCapacity.eq20_simplified_objective

by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

autonomous-vehiclescapacity-planningnewsvendorp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-bookp2o-v1ride-hailing

Consider a common-platform market with a>0a > 0a>0, 0<r<10 < r < 10<r<1, t2>0t_2 > 0t2​>0, V>0V > 0V>0, constant HV reservation earnings w0w_0w0​ (α=0\alpha = 0α=0), and AV costs cv,cf>0c_v, c_f > 0cv​,cf​>0 with cv+cf<w0c_v + c_f < w_0cv​+cf​<w0​ (Assumption 1). There are I≥1I \ge 1I≥1 demand scenarios with potential demand masses 0<m1<⋯<mI0 < m_1 < \dots < m_I0<m1​<⋯<mI​ and probabilities P(mi)≥0P(m_i) \ge 0P(mi​)≥0 summing to 111; every scenario is a loose market, with maximal stable pure-HV equilibrium demand dHV,i∗d^*_{HV,i}dHV,i∗​ and fleet size nHV,i∗=n‾(dHV,i∗)n^*_{HV,i} = \underline{n}(d^*_{HV,i})nHV,i∗​=n​(dHV,i∗​). Then for every capacity N≥0N \ge 0N≥0 the monopoly objective (5) with the common-platform profit (251) equals

∑i=1IP(mi){max⁡0≤nAV,i≤NπiC(nAV,i) nAV,i}−cfN=(w0−cv)∑i=1IP(mi)min⁡{N,nHV,i∗}−cfN.\sum_{i=1}^I P(m_i)\Big\{\max_{0 \le n_{AV,i} \le N} \pi^C_i(n_{AV,i})\, n_{AV,i}\Big\} - c_f N = (w_0 - c_v) \sum_{i=1}^I P(m_i) \min\{N, n^*_{HV,i}\} - c_f N.i=1∑I​P(mi​){0≤nAV,i​≤Nmax​πiC​(nAV,i​)nAV,i​}−cf​N=(w0​−cv​)i=1∑I​P(mi​)min{N,nHV,i∗​}−cf​N.

This turns the capacity problem into a newsvendor problem with underage cost w0−cvw_0 - c_vw0​−cv​ and overage cost cfc_fcf​.

Formalization Note. Scenarios are indexed by Fin I (0-based). The inner maximum of (5) is a real supremum over [0,N][0, N][0,N].

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_AVRideHail_MonopolyCapacity_Model
Formal statement
namespace AVRideHail.MonopolyCapacity

theorem eq20_simplified_objective (P : AVRideHail.PureHV.MarketParams) (ha : 0 < P.a) (hr0 : 0 < P.r)
    (hr1 : P.r < 1) (ht2 : 0 < P.t2) (hV : 0 < P.V) (halpha : P.alpha = 0)
    (cv cf : ℝ) (hcv : 0 < cv) (hcf : 0 < cf) (hA1 : cv + cf < P.w0)
    (I : ℕ) (hI : 0 < I) (prob : Fin I → ℝ) (hprob : ∀ i, 0 ≤ prob i) (hsum : ∑ i, prob i = 1)
    (m : Fin I → ℝ) (hm : StrictMono m) (hmpos : ∀ i, 0 < m i)
    (hloose : ∀ i, AVRideHail.PureHV.LooseMarket P (m i))
    (dstar : Fin I → ℝ) (hdstar : ∀ i, AVRideHail.PureHV.IsMaxStableEq P (m i) (dstar i))
    (N : ℝ) (hN : 0 ≤ N) :
    monoProfit P cv cf prob m dstar N =
      profit20 P cv cf prob (fun i => AVRideHail.PureHV.nMin P (dstar i)) N := by sorry

end AVRideHail.MonopolyCapacity
Source
Lian & van Ryzin, Capturing the Benefits of Autonomous Vehicles in Ride-Hailing: The Role of Market Configuration, SSRN 3716491 (version of 23 August 2023), pp. 28–29, (20), with (5) on p. 10
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 14, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 14, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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