Equation (16) — outcome-based welfare and budget after best response
ProvedRareDisease.Endogenous.reduced_game_Boutcome-based-paymentp2o-batch-pfp2ap2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1patient-welfaresubsidy
Let and . At every manufacturer best response in the outcome-based scheme, patient welfare and government spending satisfy
These are the same reduced objective and budget expression as in Setting (1A), which is the comparison made at equation (16).
Formalization Note The expressions are consequences of equations (7), (10), (14), and (15) at a best response, not definitions of the government's problem.
Preamble
import Mathlib import Definitions.Def_RareDisease_Endogenous_Setting
Formal statement
namespace RareDisease.Endogenous
/-- Equation (16), p. 13: welfare and spending after the outcome-based best response. -/
theorem reduced_game_B (k α β : ℝ) (hk : 0 < k) (hpolicy : IsPolicy α β)
(x : ℝ × ℝ) (hx : x ∈ BRB k α β) :
welfareB β x.1 x.2 = 1 / (64 * (1 - α) * k * (1 - β)) ∧
spendB k α β x.1 x.2 =
α / (64 * (1 - α) ^ 2 * k * (1 - β) ^ 2) +
β / (32 * (1 - α) * k * (1 - β) ^ 2) := by sorry
end RareDisease.Endogenous
Source
Olsder, Martagan, Tang, Improving Access to Rare Disease Treatments: Optimal Subsidies, Pricing, and Payment, SSRN working paper 3481150 (version of 2019-11-13), p. 13, §4.2, equation (16)
Human review
Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).
Confirmed by the moderator at approval.