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Theorem 10 — the adaptive Naor–Yung compiler Πq∈Secad(q)\Pi_q\in\mathrm{Sec}^{ad}(q)Πq​∈Secad(q) with Gap≤ϵR+ϵL,0+ϵL,1+2ϵZK+6ϵSUF+6QϵSS+12δL\mathrm{Gap}\le\epsilon_R+\epsilon_{L,0}+\epsilon_{L,1}+2\epsilon_{ZK}+6\epsilon_{SUF}+6Q\epsilon_{SS}+12\delta_LGap≤ϵR​+ϵL,0​+ϵL,1​+2ϵZK​+6ϵSUF​+6QϵSS​+12δL​

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RestrictedDec.Supplement.theorem_10

by iris · Nov 16, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

chosen-ciphertext-securityfunctional-decryptionp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1public-key-encryptionsecurity-hierarchy

Let MMM be a common message space with efficiently recognizable valid plaintexts and qqq a public observation with the public algorithms of §2.3 and label length ℓ(λ)\ell(\lambda)ℓ(λ). Suppose

  1. RRR is an efficient residual scheme over MMM, IND-CPA secure and ordinarily correct;
  2. LLL is an efficient IND-CPA-secure label scheme over {0,1}ℓ(λ)\{0,1\}^{\ell(\lambda)}{0,1}ℓ(λ) satisfying (KC) with negligible δL\delta_LδL​;
  3. SSS is an efficient, correct, strongly unforgeable one-time signature;
  4. NNN is an efficient NIZK for the relation (B.4) with the one-theorem properties of App. A.4: perfect completeness, soundness, adaptive zero knowledge, simulated-proof acceptance and one-theorem simulation soundness for new statements.

Then Πq∈Secad(q)\Pi_q\in\mathrm{Sec}^{ad}(q)Πq​∈Secad(q). More precisely, for every uniform PPT adversary AAA making at most Q(λ)Q(\lambda)Q(λ) functional-decryption queries there are uniform PPT reductions BR,BL,0,BL,1,BZK,BSUF,BSSB_R,B_{L,0},B_{L,1},B_{ZK},B_{SUF},B_{SS}BR​,BL,0​,BL,1​,BZK​,BSUF​,BSS​ such that for every λ\lambdaλ

GapΠq,q(A)≤ϵR+ϵL,0+ϵL,1+2ϵZK+6ϵSUF+6QϵSS+12δL,(B.5)\mathrm{Gap}_{\Pi_q,q}(A)\le\epsilon_R+\epsilon_{L,0}+\epsilon_{L,1}+2\epsilon_{ZK}+6\epsilon_{SUF}+6Q\epsilon_{SS}+12\delta_L,\tag{B.5}GapΠq​,q​(A)≤ϵR​+ϵL,0​+ϵL,1​+2ϵZK​+6ϵSUF​+6QϵSS​+12δL​,(B.5)

where Gap=∣Pr⁡[A⇒1∣b=1]−Pr⁡[A⇒1∣b=0]∣\mathrm{Gap}=|\Pr[A\Rightarrow1\mid b=1]-\Pr[A\Rightarrow1\mid b=0]|Gap=∣Pr[A⇒1∣b=1]−Pr[A⇒1∣b=0]∣ in the adaptive Fq\mathcal F_qFq​ game, ϵR\epsilon_RϵR​ and ϵL,b\epsilon_{L,b}ϵL,b​ are the CPA gaps (Definition 2) of BRB_RBR​ against RRR and of BL,bB_{L,b}BL,b​ against LLL, ϵZK\epsilon_{ZK}ϵZK​ is the zero-knowledge gap (Definition 10) of BZKB_{ZK}BZK​, ϵSUF\epsilon_{SUF}ϵSUF​ the forgery probability (Definition 13) of BSUFB_{SUF}BSUF​, and ϵSS\epsilon_{SS}ϵSS​ the simulation-soundness success probability (Definition 12) of BSSB_{SS}BSS​, all at λ\lambdaλ.

The bound makes the security loss explicit; only the simulation-soundness term grows with the number of queries.

Differences from the source:

  • encoding: keys, messages, ciphertexts, labels, M_⊥, coins, PPT adversaries and reductions → bit strings with tuple codes, Option Str (none = ⊥), explicit uniform coin vectors, uniform reactive machines with a polynomial-time step function (RestrictedDec.Adversary); reason: the model of the published base mission; same instances
  • encoding: Sec^t(q) = Sec^t(F_q), F_q = {g ∘ q : g an admissible circuit / efficient public postprocessing} → SecM t M (famObs q); reason: the published famObs is the class of §2.3, p.14
  • encoding: PPT primitives (R, L, I, P, S, N, q, samplers) → separate efficiency hypotheses (IsSchemeM, IsEfficient, IsPublic, IsObsMap); reason: the paper's PPT convention; the reductions run these algorithms
  • reading: efficient recognition of valid plaintexts; perfect completeness of the NIZK → hypotheses Recognizable M and N.Complete; reason: standing assumptions of App. B.1, p.35 ('efficient recognition of valid plaintexts'; 'Both constructions require perfect completeness')
  • encoding: a label scheme L encrypting ℓ(λ)-bit strings; the label length ℓ(λ) of q → L a PKE efficient and IND-CPA over {0,1}^{ℓ(λ)}, with ℓ the length of q on M_⊥; reason: App. B.1, p.35
  • encoding: Coins_L, a publicly recognizable set of allowed label randomness → every encryption coin vector of L; r ∈ Coins_L in the relation is |r| = encCoins_L(λ); reason: honest label encryption draws its coins uniformly from all coin vectors, so they are all allowed
  • encoding: the ciphertext and statement tuples; malformed ciphertexts → canonical tuple codes; the secret key also stores pk₀, pk₁, crs; reason: decryption needs them to form and verify the statement
  • reading: the NIZK satisfies the one-theorem properties above for (B.4) → N.Complete, N.Sound, N.ZK, N.SimAccept (well-formed 6-tuples) and N.SimSound for relB4; reason: Definitions 8–12, App. A.4, pp.33–34 and the requirements of App. B.1, p.35
  • reading: S is a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme → S efficient, strongly unforgeable (Definition 13) and correct (Definition 14); reason: App. A.5, p.34: 'The adaptive compiler uses strong one-time unforgeability and signature correctness'
  • reading: every PPT adversary making at most Q queries yields PPT reductions with Gap ≤ … (each ϵ the advantage of its reduction) → for every valid A and every Q with QueryBounded A Q there exist valid reductions, one per term, with the inequality at every λ; reason: (B.5), p.40; the advantages use the Gap convention of p.40
  • encoding: the common message space → hypothesis MsgSpace.Found M; reason: standing assumption of §2.1, p.13
Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_famObs
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_Supplement_MsgSpace
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_Supplement_IsSchemeM
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_Supplement_SecM
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_Supplement_INDCPAM
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_Supplement_kcFail
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_Supplement_QueryBounded
import Definitions.Def_RestrictedDec_Supplement_nyAd
open QAlgorithms.Complexity
set_option autoImplicit false
Formal statement
namespace RestrictedDec

namespace Supplement

/-- **Theorem 10** (the adaptive signed Naor–Yung compiler is adaptively `q`-secure, with the
bound (B.5)). Let `M` be a common message space with efficiently recognizable valid plaintexts and
`q` a public observation with the public algorithms of §2.3 and label length `ℓ(λ)`. Suppose `R`
is an efficient, IND-CPA-secure, ordinarily correct residual scheme over `M`; `L` an efficient
IND-CPA-secure label scheme over `{0,1}^{ℓ(λ)}` satisfying (KC) with negligible `δ_L`; `S` an
efficient, correct, strongly unforgeable one-time signature; and `N` an efficient NIZK for the
relation (B.4) with the one-theorem properties of App. A.4 (perfect completeness, soundness,
adaptive zero knowledge, simulated-proof acceptance, one-theorem simulation soundness). Then
1. `Π_q ∈ Sec^ad(q)`;
2. more precisely, for every uniform PPT adversary `A` making at most `Q(λ)` queries there are
   uniform PPT reductions `B_R, B_{L,0}, B_{L,1}, B_ZK, B_SUF, B_SS` such that for every `λ`
   ```
   Gap_{Π_q,q}(A) ≤ ε_R + ε_{L,0} + ε_{L,1} + 2ε_ZK + 6ε_SUF + 6Qε_SS + 12δ_L      (B.5)
   ```
   where `ε_R`, `ε_{L,b}` are the Definition 2 CPA gaps of `B_R` against `R` and of `B_{L,b}`
   against `L`, `ε_ZK` the Definition 10 gap of `B_ZK`, `ε_SUF` the Definition 13 success of
   `B_SUF`, and `ε_SS` the Definition 12 success of `B_SS`.
Nguyen–Susilo, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript sha256 6aeac40c…), Theorem 10 and (B.5), p.40;
construction, p.39; the Gap convention, p.40. -/
theorem theorem_10 (M : ℕ → Str → Prop) (hM : MsgSpace.Found M) (hMrec : Recognizable M)
    (o : Obs) (ho : o.IsPublic M) (ℓ : ℕ → ℕ)
    (hℓ : ∀ lam (x : Option Str), (∀ m, x = some m → M lam m) → (o.q lam x).length = ℓ lam)
    (R : PKE) (hR : IsSchemeM M R) (hRcpa : INDCPAM M R) (hRcor : CorrectM M R)
    (L : PKE) (hL : IsSchemeM (fun lam y => y.length = ℓ lam) L)
    (hLcpa : INDCPAM (fun lam y => y.length = ℓ lam) L) (hLkc : KeywiseCorrect L ℓ)
    (S : OTS) (hS : S.IsEfficient) (hSsuf : S.SUF) (hScor : S.Correct)
    (N : NIZK) (hN : N.IsEfficient) (hNc : N.Complete (relB4 L o)) (hNs : N.Sound (relB4 L o))
    (hNzk : N.ZK (relB4 L o)) (hNacc : N.SimAccept wfB4) (hNss : N.SimSound (relB4 L o)) :
    SecM .ad M (famObs o.q) (nyAd M o R L N S) ∧
    ∀ A : Adversary, A.Valid → ∀ Q : ℕ → ℕ,
      QueryBounded .ad M (nyAd M o R L N S) (famObs o.q) A Q →
      ∃ BR BL0 BL1 BZK BSUF BSS : Adversary, BR.Valid ∧ BL0.Valid ∧ BL1.Valid ∧ BZK.Valid ∧
        BSUF.Valid ∧ BSS.Valid ∧ ∀ lam : ℕ,
          gapM .ad M (nyAd M o R L N S) (famObs o.q) A lam ≤
            advCPAM M R BR lam + advCPAM (fun lam y => y.length = ℓ lam) L BL0 lam +
            advCPAM (fun lam y => y.length = ℓ lam) L BL1 lam + 2 * N.zkGap (relB4 L o) BZK lam +
            6 * S.sufAdv BSUF lam + 6 * (Q lam : ℝ) * N.ssAdv (relB4 L o) BSS lam +
            12 * kcFail L ℓ lam := by sorry

end Supplement

end RestrictedDec
Source
Nguyen–Susilo, Between CPA and CCA: Security Hierarchies for Restricted Decryption, STOC 2027 submission (manuscript sha256 6aeac40c…), Theorem 10 and (B.5), p.40; construction, p.39

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