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Section 5 — the conflict payoff is incentive-feasible

Proved
MyersonBargaining.NashSolution.conflict_payoff_in_FStar

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

bargainingincentive-compatibilitymechanism-designp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1

Fix a conflict choice c∗∈Cc^*\in Cc∗∈C in a finite Bayesian collective choice problem. The direct mechanism that always selects c∗c^*c∗ is a choice mechanism and is Bayesian incentive-compatible. Its interim payoff vector equals the conflict vector ttt, where

ti,ai=∑αPi(α∣ai)Ui(c∗,α).t_{i,a_i}=\sum_\alpha P_i(\alpha\mid a_i)U_i(c^*,\alpha).ti,ai​​=α∑​Pi​(α∣ai​)Ui​(c∗,α).

Consequently t∈F∗t\in F^*t∈F∗. This gives the individually rational set F+∗F^*_+F+∗​ a feasible reference point.

Formalization Note The constant mechanism is π(c∣α)=1\pi(c\mid\alpha)=1π(c∣α)=1 if c=c∗c=c^*c=c∗ and 000 otherwise. The conflict vector ttt is defined by the displayed formula (16), not as the payoff of this mechanism; that the two agree is the third conjunct, and t∈F∗t\in F^*t∈F∗ the fourth.

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_MyersonBargaining_NashSolution_Bargaining
Formal statement
namespace MyersonBargaining.NashSolution

variable {ι : Type} [Fintype ι] [DecidableEq ι] [Nonempty ι]
  {A : ι → Type} [∀ i, Fintype (A i)] [∀ i, DecidableEq (A i)]
  [∀ i, Nonempty (A i)] {C : Type} [Fintype C] [DecidableEq C] [Nonempty C]

/-- Section 5, p. 68: constant conflict choice generates an incentive-feasible payoff. -/
theorem conflict_payoff_in_FStar (G : Problem ι A C) (cstar : C) :
    IsChoiceMechanism (constMech (A := A) cstar) ∧
    IsBIC G (constMech (A := A) cstar) ∧
    V G (constMech (A := A) cstar) = conflictPayoff G cstar ∧
    conflictPayoff G cstar ∈ FStar G := by sorry

end MyersonBargaining.NashSolution
Source
Myerson, Incentive compatibility and the bargaining problem, Econometrica 47 (1979), p. 68, Section 5, after Eq. (16)
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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