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Corollary 2, p. 13 — the seller's optimal (p*, q*, r*) maximizes social welfare (12)–(13)

Proved
SuReturns.PartialRefunds.corollary2_welfare

by mikedeng1 · Oct 6, 2026 · Mathlib 0df444a (Lean v4.33.1)

consumer-returnsnewsvendorp2o-batch-pfp2bp2o-gran-per-chapterp2o-plan-paperp2o-v1social-welfare

Standing assumptions (Su pp. 6–7): market demand X∼DX \sim DX∼D with X≥0X \ge 0X≥0; consumer valuations V∼νV \sim \nuV∼ν with finite mean μ=EV\mu = EVμ=EV; unit cost ccc and salvage value sss with 0≤s<c<μ0 \le s < c < \mu0≤s<c<μ. Let FFF be the distribution function of DDD, Fˉ=1−F\bar F = 1 - FFˉ=1−F, and SW(p,q,r)SW(p,q,r)SW(p,q,r) the social welfare (12)–(13) under demand rule (6). Let q∗q^*q∗ satisfy

Fˉ(q∗)=c−sEmax⁡(V,s)−s.\bar F(q^*) = \frac{c - s}{E\max(V, s) - s}.Fˉ(q∗)=Emax(V,s)−sc−s​.

Then for every price ppp, refund rrr and stocking quantity q≥0q \ge 0q≥0,

SW(p,q,r)≤SW(Emax⁡(V,s), q∗, s).SW(p, q, r) \le SW\big(E\max(V, s),\, q^*,\, s\big).SW(p,q,r)≤SW(Emax(V,s),q∗,s).

This is Corollary 2: the profit-maximizing policy of Proposition 2 also maximizes the sum of consumer surplus and seller profit, so with valuation uncertainty resolved after purchase, monopoly pricing causes no welfare loss.

Formalization Note Welfare carries the demand rule (6): at a price above the reservation price Emax⁡(V,r)E\max(V,r)Emax(V,r) nobody buys and the welfare is −(c−s)q-(c-s)q−(c−s)q. Only optimality is claimed, not uniqueness. Demand is assumed nonnegative (D((−∞,0))=0D((-\infty,0)) = 0D((−∞,0))=0) and stocking quantities range over q≥0q \ge 0q≥0: the page's demand is "a mass of infinitesimal consumers" and qqq a "stocking quantity", and without these readings the profit is unbounded (a negative qqq with a very negative price makes it arbitrarily large). 0≤s0 \le s0≤s is the page's own "0≤s≤c0 \le s \le c0≤s≤c" (p. 26). The valuation law is a general probability measure with integrable identity rather than a density ggg; Gˉ(r)=P(V≥r)\bar G(r) = \mathbb P(V \ge r)Gˉ(r)=P(V≥r) follows the page's tie rule (keep iff V≥rV \ge rV≥r).

Preamble
import Mathlib
import Definitions.Def_SuReturns_PartialRefunds_Model

open MeasureTheory ProbabilityTheory
Formal statement
namespace SuReturns.PartialRefunds

theorem corollary2_welfare (ν D : Measure ℝ) [IsProbabilityMeasure ν]
    [IsProbabilityMeasure D] (hν : Integrable (fun v => v) ν) (hD0 : D (Set.Iio 0) = 0)
    (c s : ℝ) (hs0 : 0 ≤ s) (hsc : s < c) (hcμ : c < meanValuation ν)
    (qstar : ℝ) (hq : 1 - cdf D qstar = (c - s) / (reservationPrice ν s - s)) :
    ∀ p r q, 0 ≤ q → welfare ν D c s p q r ≤ welfare ν D c s (reservationPrice ν s) qstar s := by sorry

end SuReturns.PartialRefunds
Source
Su, Consumer Returns Policies and Supply Chain Performance, SSRN 1020451 (version of August 2008), p. 13, Corollary 2, welfare (12)–(13); proof p. 27
Human review
  • Endorsed by Shuze Chen · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the moderator at approval.

  • Endorsed by mikedeng1 · Oct 7, 2026

    Confirmed by the mission captain (proposal self-audit).

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